aim of man, i.e. final release.  When we therefore, on the other hand, find that the subjects of the so-called lower vidya are treated very fully in the Vedanta-sutras, when we observe, for instance, the almost tedious length to which the investigation of the unity of vidyas (most of which are so-called sagu/n/a, i.e. lower vidyas) is carried in the third adhyaya, or the fact of almost the whole fourth adhyaya being devoted to the ultimate fate of the possessor of the lower vidya; we certainly feel ourselves confirmed in our conclusion that what Sa@nkara looked upon as comparatively unimportant formed in Badaraya/n/a’s opinion part of that knowledge higher than which there is none, and which therefore is entitled to the fullest and most detailed exposition.

The question as to what kind of system is represented by the Vedanta-sutras may be approached in another way also.  While hitherto we have attempted to penetrate to the meaning of the Sutras by means of the different commentaries, we might try the opposite road, and, in the first place, attempt to ascertain independently of the Sutras what doctrine is set forth in the Upanishads, whose teaching the Sutras doubtless aim at systematising.  If, it might be urged, the Upanishads can be convincingly shown to embody a certain settled doctrine, we must consider it at the least highly probable that that very same doctrine—­of whatever special nature it may be—­is hidden in the enigmatical aphorisms of Badaraya/n/a.[24]

I do not, however, consider this line of argumentation a safe one.  Even if it could be shown that the teaching of all the chief Upanishads agrees in all essential points (a subject to which some attention will be paid later on), we should not on that account be entitled unhesitatingly to assume that the Sutras set forth the same doctrine.  Whatever the true philosophy of the Upanishads may be, there remains the undeniable fact that there exist and have existed since very ancient times not one but several essentially differing systems, all of which lay claim to the distinction of being the true representatives of the teaching of the Upanishads as well as of the Sutras.  Let us suppose, for argument’s sake, that, for instance, the doctrine of Maya is distinctly enunciated in the Upanishads; nevertheless Ramanuja and, for all we know to the contrary, the whole series of more ancient commentators on whom he looked as authorities in the interpretation of the Sutras, denied that the Upanishads teach Maya, and it is hence by no means impossible that Badaraya/n/a should have done the same.  The a priori style of reasoning as to the teaching of the Sutras is therefore without much force.