In the conspectus I have given it as my opinion that the Sutras in which the size of the individual soul is discussed can hardly be understood in Sa@nkara’s sense, and rather seem to favour the opinion, held among others by Ramanuja, that the soul is of minute size.  We have further seen that Sutra 18 of the third pada of the second adhyaya, which describes the soul as ‘j/n/a,’ is more appropriately understood in the sense assigned to it by Ramanuja; and, again, that the Sutras which treat of the soul being an agent, can be reconciled with Sa@nkara’s views only if supplemented in a way which their text does not appear to authorise.—­We next have the important Sutra II, 3, 43 in which the soul is distinctly said to be a part (a/ms/a) of Brahman, and which, as we have already noticed, can be made to fall in with Sa@nkara’s views only if a/ms/a is explained, altogether arbitrarily, by ‘a/ms/a iva,’ while Ramanuja is able to take the Sutra as it stands.—­We also have already referred to Sutra 50, ‘abhasa eva ka,’ which Sa@nkara interprets as setting forth the so-called pratibimbavada according to which the individual Self is merely a reflection of the highest Self.  But almost every Sutra—­and Sutra 50 forms no exception—­being so obscurely expressed, that viewed by itself it admits of various, often totally opposed, interpretations, the only safe method is to keep in view, in the case of each ambiguous aphorism, the general drift and spirit of the whole work, and that, as we have seen hitherto, is by no means favourable to the pratibimba doctrine.  How indeed could Sutra 50, if setting forth that latter doctrine, be reconciled with Sutra 43, which says distinctly that the soul is a part of Brahman?  For that 43 contains, as Sa@nkara and his commentators aver, a statement of the ava/kkh/edavada, can itself be accepted only if we interpret a/ms/a by a/ms/a iva, and to do so there is really no valid reason whatever.  I confess that Ramanuja’s interpretation of the Sutra (which however is accepted by several other commentators also) does not appear to me particularly convincing; and the Sutras unfortunately offer us no other passages on the ground of which we might settle the meaning to be ascribed to the term abhasa, which may mean ‘reflection,’ but may mean hetvabhasa, i.e. fallacious argument, as well.  But as things stand, this one Sutra cannot, at any rate, be appealed to as proving that the pratibimbavada which, in its turn, presupposes the mayavada, is the teaching of the Sutras.

To the conclusion that the Sutrakara did not hold the doctrine of the absolute identity of the highest and the individual soul in the sense of Sa@nkara, we are further led by some other indications to be met with here and there in the Sutras.  In the conspectus of contents we have had occasion to direct attention to the important Sutra II, 1, 22, which distinctly enunciates that the Lord is adhika, i.e.