In connexion with the two passages discussed, we meet in the fourth adhyaya with another passage, which indeed has no direct bearing on the distinction of apara and para vidya, but may yet be shortly referred to in this place as another and altogether undoubted instance of Sa@nkara’s interpretations not always agreeing with the text of the Sutras.  The Sutras 7-16 of the third pada state the opinions of three different teachers on the question to which Brahman the soul of the vidvan repairs on death, or—­according to Ramanuja—­the worshippers of which Brahman repair to (the highest) Brahman.  Ramanuja treats the views of Badari and Jaimini as two purvapakshas, and the opinion of Badaraya/n/a—­which is stated last—­as the siddhanta. Sa@nkara, on the other hand, detaching the Sutras in which Badaraya/n/a’s view is set forth from the preceding part of the adhikara/n/a (a proceeding which, although not plausible, yet cannot be said to be altogether illegitimate), maintains that Badari’s view, which is expounded first, represents the siddhanta, while Jaimini’s view, set forth subsequently, is to be considered a mere purvapaksha.  This, of course, is altogether inadmissible, it being the invariable practice of the Vedanta-sutras as well as the Purva Mima/m/sa-sutras to conclude the discussion of contested points with the statement of that view which is to be accepted as the authoritative one.  This is so patent that Sa@nkara feels himself called upon to defend his deviation from the general rule (Commentary on IV, 4, 13), without, however, bringing forward any arguments but such as are valid only if Sa@nkara’s system itself is already accepted.

The previous considerations leave us, I am inclined to think, no choice but to side with Ramanuja as to the general subject-matter of the fourth adhyaya of the Sutras.  We need not accept him as our guide in all particular interpretations, but we must acknowledge with him that the Sutras of the fourth adhyaya describe the ultimate fate of one and the same vidvan, and do not afford any basis for the distinction of a higher and lower knowledge of Brahman in Sa@nkara’s sense.

If we have not to discriminate between a lower and a higher knowledge of Brahman, it follows that the distinction of a lower and a higher Brahman is likewise not valid.  But this is not a point to be decided at once on the negative evidence of the fourth adhyaya, but regarding which the entire body of the Vedanta-sutras has to be consulted.  And intimately connected with this investigation—­in fact, one with it from a certain point of view—­is the question whether the Sutras afford any evidence of their author having held the doctrine of Maya, the principle of illusion, by the association with which the highest Brahman, in itself transcending all qualities, appears as the lower Brahman or I/s/vara.  That Ramanuja denies the distinction of the two Brahmans and the doctrine of Maya we have seen above; we shall, however, in the subsequent investigation, pay less attention to his views and interpretations than to the indications furnished by the Sutras themselves.