that conjunction (sa/m/yoga) also as being eternally connected with the things which it joins does, like samavaya, not require another connexion[364].  If you say that conjunction does require another connexion because it is a different thing[365] we reply that then samavaya also requires another connexion because it is likewise a different thing.  Nor can you say that conjunction does require another connexion because it is a quality (gu/n/a), and samavaya does not because it is not a quality; for (in spite of this difference) the reason for another connexion being required is the same in both cases[366], and not that which is technically called ‘quality’ is the cause (of another connexion being required)[367].—­For these reasons those who acknowledge samavaya to be a separate existence are driven into a regressus in infinitum, in consequence of which, the impossibility of one term involving the impossibility of the entire series, not even the origination of a binary compound from two atoms can be accounted for.—­For this reason also the atomic doctrine is inadmissible.

14.  And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity).

Moreover, the atoms would have to be assumed as either essentially active (moving) or essentially non-active, or both or neither; there being no fifth alternative.  But none of the four alternatives stated is possible.  If they were essentially active, their activity would be permanent so that no pralaya could take place.  If they were essentially non-active, their non-activity would be permanent, and no creation could take place.  Their being both is impossible because self-contradictory.  If they were neither, their activity and non-activity would have to depend on an operative cause, and then the operative causes such as the ad/ri/sh/t/a being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would result; or else the ad/ri/sh/t/a and so on not being taken as operative causes, the consequence would be permanent non-activity on the part of the atoms.—­For this reason also the atomic doctrine is untenable.

15.  And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse (of the Vai/s/eshika tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.

Let us suppose, the Vai/s/eshikas say, all substances composed of parts to be disintegrated into their parts; a limit will finally be reached beyond which the process of disintegration cannot be continued.  What constitutes that limit are the atoms, which are eternal (permanent), belong to four different classes, possess the qualities of colour, &c., and are the originating principles of this whole material world with its colour, form, and other qualities.