This argumentation, we rejoin, is not sound.  Just as the qualities of sphericity and so on, although existing in the cause, do not produce corresponding effects, so it is with intelligence also; so that the two cases are parallel so far.  Nor can the circumstance of the effects being engrossed by a different form of extension be alleged as the reason of sphericity, &c. not originating qualities similar to themselves; for the power of originating effects belongs to sphericity, &c. before another form of extension begins to exist.  For it is admitted that the substance produced remains for a moment devoid of qualities, and that thereupon only (i.e. after that moment) its qualities begin to exist.  Nor, again, can it be said that sphericity, &c. concentrate their activity on originating other forms of extension[357], and therefore do not originate forms of extension belonging to the same class as their own; for it is admitted that the origin of other forms is due to other causes; as the Sutras of Ka/n/abhuj (Ka/n/ada) themselves declare (Vai/s/.  Sut.  VII, 1, 9, ’Bigness is produced from plurality inherent in the causes, from bigness of the cause and from a kind of accumulation;’ VII, 1, 10, ‘The contrary of this (the big) is the minute;’ VII, 1, 17, ’Thereby length and shortness are explained[358]’).—­Nor, again, can it be said that plurality, &c. inherent in the cause originate (like effects) in consequence of some peculiar proximity (in which they are supposed to stand to the effected substance), while sphericity, &c. (not standing in a like proximity) do not; for when a new substance or a new quality is originated, all the qualities of the cause stand in the same relation of inherence to their abode (i.e. the causal substance in which they inhere).  For these reasons the fact of sphericity, &c. not originating like effects can be explained from the essential nature of sphericity, &c. only, and the same may therefore be maintained with regard to intelligence[359].

Moreover, from that observed fact also, that from conjunction (sa/m/yoga) there originate substances, &c. belonging to a class different (from that to which conjunction itself belongs), it follows that the doctrine of effects belonging to the same class as the causes from which they spring is too wide.  If you remark against this last argument that, as we have to do at present with a substance (viz.  Brahman), it is inappropriate to instance a quality (viz. conjunction) as a parallel case; we point out that at present we only wish to explain the origination of effects belonging to a different class in general.  Nor is there any reason for the restriction that substances only are to be adduced as examples for substances, and qualities only for qualities.  Your own Sutrakara adduces a quality as furnishing a parallel case for a substance (Vai/s/.  Sut.  IV, 2, 2, ’On account of the conjunction of things perceptible and things imperceptible being imperceptible the body is not composed of five elements’).  Just