enter into the state of non-manifestation; hence the water is never really destitute of waves, not any more than the lamp is ever destitute of heat and light.—­That that which causes suffering, and that which suffers constitute different classes of things is, moreover, well known from ordinary experience.  For (to consider the matter from a more general point of view) the person desiring and the thing desired[338] are understood to be separate existences.  If the object of desire were not essentially different and separate from the person desiring, the state of being desirous could not be ascribed to the latter, because the object with reference to which alone he can be called desiring would already essentially be established in him (belong to him).  The latter state of things exists in the case of a lamp and its light, for instance.  Light essentially belongs to the lamp, and hence the latter never can stand in want of light; for want or desire can exist only if the thing wanted or desired is not yet obtained.

(And just as there could be no desiring person, if the object of desire and the desiring person were not essentially separate), so the object of desire also would cease to be an object for the desiring person, and would be an object for itself only.  As a matter of fact, however, this is not the case; for the two ideas (and terms), ‘object of desire’ and ‘desiring person,’ imply a relation (are correlative), and a relation exists in two things, not in one only.  Hence the desiring person and the object of desire are separate.—­The same holds good with regard to what is not desired (object of aversion; anartha) and the non-desiring person (anarthin).

An object of desire is whatever is of advantage to the desiring person, an object of aversion whatever is of disadvantage; with both one person enters into relation by turns.  On account of the comparative paucity of the objects of desire, and the comparative multitude of the objects of aversion, both may be comprised under the general term, ’object of aversion.’  Now, these objects of aversion we mean when we use the term ‘causes of suffering,’ while by the term ‘sufferer’ we understand the soul which, being one, enters into successive relations with both (i.e. the objects of desire and the objects of aversion).  If, then, the causes of suffering and the sufferer constitute one Self (as the Vedanta teaches), it follows that final release is impossible.—­But if, on the other hand, the two are assumed to constitute separate classes, the possibility of release is not excluded, since the cause of the connexion of the two (viz. wrong knowledge) may be removed.