Even in that case, we reply, the objections stated above which were founded on the impossibility of an orderly arrangement of the world, &c., remain in force on account of the pradhana being devoid of the power of intelligence.  And if (to escape those objections) the Sa@nkhya should infer (from the orderly arrangement of the world, &c.), that the primal cause is intelligent, he would cease to be an antagonist, since the doctrine that there is one intelligent cause of this multiform world would be nothing else but the Vedantic doctrine of Brahman.—­Moreover, if the gu/n/as were capable of entering into the relation of mutual inequality even while in the state of equipoise, one of two things would happen; they would either not be in the condition of inequality on account of the absence of an operative cause; or else, if they were in that condition, they would always remain in it; the absence of an operative cause being a non-changing circumstance.  And thus the doctrine would again be open to the objection stated before[333].

10.  And moreover (the Sa@nkhya doctrine) is objectionable on account of its contradictions.

The doctrine of the Sa@nkhyas, moreover, is full of contradictions.  Sometimes they enumerate seven senses, sometimes eleven[334].  In some places they teach that the subtle elements of material things proceed from the great principle, in other places again that they proceed from self-consciousness.  Sometimes they speak of three internal organs, sometimes of one only[335].  That their doctrine, moreover, contradicts Sruti, which teaches that the Lord is the cause of the world, and Sm/ri/ti, based on Sruti, is well known.—­For these reasons also the Sa@nkhya system is objectionable.

Here the Sa@nkhya again brings a countercharge—­The system of the Vedantins also, he says, must be declared to be objectionable; for it does not admit that that which suffers and that which causes suffering[336] are different classes of things (and thereby renders futile the well-established distinction of causes of suffering and suffering beings).  For those who admit the one Brahman to be the Self of everything and the cause of the whole world, have to admit also that the two attributes of being that which causes suffering and that which suffers belong to the one supreme Self (not to different classes of beings).  If, then, these two attributes belong to one and the same Self, it never can divest itself of them, and thus Scripture, which teaches perfect knowledge for the purpose of the cessation of all suffering, loses all its meaning.  For—­to adduce a parallel case—­a lamp as long as it subsists as such is never divested of the two qualities of giving heat and light.  And if the Vedantin should adduce the case of water with its waves, ripples, foam, &c.[337], we remark that there also the waves, &c. constitute attributes of the water which remain permanently, although they by turns manifest themselves, and again