soul possesses no moving power.  And how should the indifferent soul move the pradhana?  A man, although lame, may make a blind man move by means of words and the like; but the soul which is devoid of action and qualities cannot possibly put forth any moving energy.  Nor can it be said that it moves the pradhana by its mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron; for from the permanency of proximity (of soul and pradhana) a permanency of motion would follow.  The proximity of the magnet, on the other hand (to the iron), is not permanent, but depends on a certain activity and the adjustment of the magnet in a certain position; hence the (lame) man and the magnet do not supply really parallel instances.—­The pradhana then being non-intelligent and the soul indifferent, and there being no third principle to connect them, there can be no connexion of the two.  If we attempted to establish a connexion on the ground of capability (of being seen on the part of the pradhana, of seeing on the part of the soul), the permanency of such capability would imply the impossibility of final release.—­Moreover, here as well as before (in the preceding Sutra) the different alternatives connected with the absence of purpose (on the pradhana’s part) have to be considered[332].—­The highest Self, on the other hand (which is the cause of the world, according to the Vedantins), is characterised by non-activity inherent in its own nature, and, at the same time, by moving power inherent in Maya and is thus superior (to the soul of the Sa@nkhyas).

8.  And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three gu/n/as).

For the following reason also activity on the part of the pradhana is not possible.—­The condition of the pradhana consists in the three gu/n/as, viz. goodness, passion, and darkness, abiding in themselves in a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of mutual superiority or inferiority.  In that state the gu/n/as cannot possibly enter into the relation of mutual subserviency because thereby they would forfeit their essential characteristic, viz. absolute independence.  And as there exists no extraneous principle to stir up the gu/n/as, the production of the great principle and the other effects—­which would acquire for its operative cause a non-balanced state of the gu/n/as—­is impossible.

9.  And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in force) on account of the (pradhana) being devoid of the power of intelligence.

But—­the Sa@nkhya resumes—­we draw another inference, so as to leave no room for the objection just stated.  We do not acknowledge the gu/n/as to be characterised by absolute irrelativity and unchangeableness, since there is no proof for such an assumption.  We rather infer the characteristics of the gu/n/as from those of their effects, presuming that their nature must be such as to render the production of the effects possible.  Now the gu/n/as are admitted to be of an unsteady nature; hence the gu/n/as themselves are able to enter into the relation of mutual inequality, even while they are in a state of equipoise.