Even if we, accommodating ourselves to your (the Sa@nkhya’s) belief, should admit what has been disproved in the preceding Sutra, viz. that the pradhana is spontaneously active, still your opinion would lie open to an objection ‘on account of the absence of a purpose.’  For if the spontaneous activity of the pradhana has, as you say, no reference to anything else, it will have no reference not only to any aiding principle, but also to any purpose or motive, and consequently your doctrine that the pradhana is active in order to effect the purpose of man will become untenable.  If you reply that the pradhana does not indeed regard any aiding principle, but does regard a purpose, we remark that in that case we must distinguish between the different possible purposes, viz. either enjoyment (on the part of the soul), or final release, or both.  If enjoyment, what enjoyment, we ask, can belong to the soul which is naturally incapable of any accretion (of pleasure or pain)[327]?  Moreover, there would in that case be no opportunity for release[328].—­If release, then the activity of the pradhana would be purposeless, as even antecedently to it the soul is in the state of release; moreover, there would then be no occasion for the perception of sounds, &c.[329]—­If both, then, on account of the infinite number of the objects of pradhana to be enjoyed (by the soul)[330], there would be no opportunity for final release.  Nor can the satisfaction of a desire be considered as the purpose of the activity of the pradhana; for neither the non-intelligent pradhana nor the essentially pure soul can feel any desire.—­If, finally, you should assume the pradhana to be active, because otherwise the power of sight (belonging to the soul on account of its intelligent nature) and the creative power (belonging to the pradhana) would be purposeless; it would follow that, as the creative power of the pradhana does not cease at any time any more than the soul’s power of sight does, the apparent world would never come to an end, so that no final release of the soul could take place[331].—­It is, therefore, impossible to maintain that the pradhana enters on its activity for the purposes of the soul.

7.  And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhana) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also (the difficulty is not overcome).

Well then—­the Sa@nkhya resumes, endeavouring to defend his position by parallel instances—­let us say that, as some lame man devoid of the power of motion, but possessing the power of sight, having mounted the back of a blind man who is able to move but not to see, makes the latter move; or as the magnet not moving itself, moves the iron, so the soul moves the pradhana.—­Thus also, we reply, you do not free your doctrine from all shortcomings; for this your new position involves an abandonment of your old position, according to which the pradhana is moving of itself, and the (indifferent, inactive)