But, the Sa@nkhya rejoins, we do likewise not observe activity on the part of mere intelligent beings.—­True; we however see activity on the part of non-intelligent things such as chariots and the like when they are in conjunction with intelligent beings.—­But, the Sa@nkhya again objects, we never actually observe activity on the part of an intelligent being even when in conjunction with a non-intelligent thing.—­Very well; the question then arises:  Does the activity belong to that in which it is actually observed (as the Sa@nkhya says), or to that on account of the conjunction with which it is observed (as the Vedantin avers)?—­We must, the Sa@nkhya replies, attribute activity to that in which it is actually seen, since both (i.e. the activity and its abode) are matter of observation.  A mere intelligent being, on the other hand, is never observed as the abode of activity while a chariot is.  The[324] existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so on which are the abode of activity can be established (by inference) only; the inference being based on the difference observed between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as chariots and the like.  For this very reason, viz. that intelligence is observed only where a body is observed while it is never seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body.—­Hence activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent.

To all this we—­the Vedantins—­make the following reply.—­We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those non-intelligent things in which it is observed; it does indeed belong to them; but it results from an intelligent principle, because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist when the latter is absent.  Just as the effects of burning and shining, which have their abode in wood and similar material, are indeed not observed when there is mere fire (i.e. are not due to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, &c., does not exist), but at the same time result from fire only as they are seen when fire is present and are not seen when fire is absent; so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are observed to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelligent things.  The motive power of intelligence is therefore incontrovertible.—­But—­an objection will be raised—­your Self even if joined to a body is incapable of exercising moving power, for motion cannot be effected by that the nature of which is pure intelligence.—­A thing, we reply, which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things.  The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron; and colours and the other objects of sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the other organs of sense.  So the Lord also who is all-present, the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful may, although himself unmoving, move the universe.—­If it finally be objected that (on the Vedanta doctrine)