of the ‘orderly arrangement’ (of the world), a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred.—­The word ‘and’ (in the Sutra) adds other reasons on account of which the pradhana cannot be inferred, viz. ’on account of the non-possibility of endowment,’ &c.  For it cannot be maintained[318] that all outward and inward effects are ‘endowed’ with the nature of pleasure, pain, and dulness, because pleasure, &c. are known as inward (mental) states, while sound, &c. (i.e. the sense-objects) are known as being of a different nature (i.e. as outward things), and moreover as being the operative causes of pleasure, &c.[319] And, further, although the sense-object such as sound and so on is one, yet we observe that owing to the difference of the mental impressions (produced by it) differences exist in the effects it produces, one person being affected by it pleasantly, another painfully, and so on[320].—­(Turning to the next Sa@nkhya argument which infers the existence of the pradhana from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such as roof and sprout, &c. depend on the conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of the pradhana, viz.  Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several antecedents[321]; for they also are limited[322].—­Further[323], it is impossible to use the relation of cause and effect as a reason for assuming that all effects whatever have a non-intelligent principle for their antecedent; for we have shown already that that relation exists in the case of couches and chairs also, over whose production intelligence presides.

2.  And on account of (the impossibility of) activity.

Leaving the arrangement of the world, we now pass on to the activity by which it is produced.—­The three gu/n/as, passing out of the state of equipoise and entering into the condition of mutual subordination and superordination, originate activities tending towards the production of particular effects.—­Now these activities also cannot be ascribed to a non-intelligent pradhana left to itself, as no such activity is seen in clay and similar substances, or in chariots and the like.  For we observe that clay and the like, and chariots—­which are in their own nature non-intelligent—­enter on activities tending towards particular effects only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters, &c. in the one case, and horses and the like in the other case.  From what is seen we determine what is not seen.  Hence a non-intelligent cause of the world is not to be inferred because, on that hypothesis, the activity without which the world cannot be produced would be impossible.