whether we can, with
Sa@nkara, look upon Sutra
29 as embodying a refutation of the purvapaksha and
thus implicitly acknowledging the doctrine that the
individual soul is all-pervading. Now I think
there can be no doubt that
Sa@nkara’s
interpretation of the Sutra is exceedingly forced.
Literally translated (and leaving out the non-essential
word ‘praj/n/avat’) the Sutra runs as
follows: ’But on account of that quality
(or “those qualities;” or else “on
account of the quality—or qualities—of
that”) being the essence, (there is) that designation
(or “the designation of that").’
This
Sa@nkara maintains to mean, ’Because
the qualities of the buddhi are the essence of the
soul in the sa/m/sara state, therefore the soul itself
is sometimes spoken of as a/n/u.’ Now,
in the first place, nothing in the context warrants
the explanation of the first ‘tat’ by
buddhi. And—which is more important—in
the second place, it is more than doubtful whether
on
Sa@nkara’s own system the qualities
of the buddhi—such as pleasure, pain, desire,
aversion, &c.—can with any propriety be
said to constitute the essence of the soul even in
the sa/m/sara state. The essence of the soul in
whatever state, according to
Sa@nkara’s
system, is knowledge or intelligence; whatever is
due to its association with the buddhi is non-essential
or, more strictly, unreal, false.
There are no similar difficulties in the way of Ramanuja’s
interpretation of the adhikara/n/a. He agrees
with Sa@nkara in the explanation of Sutras
19-35, with this difference that he views them as
setting forth, not the purvapaksha, but the siddhanta.
Sutras 26-28 also are interpreted in a manner not
very different from Sa@nkara’s, special
stress being laid on the distinction made by Scripture
between knowledge as a mere quality and the soul as
a knowing agent, the substratum of knowledge.
This discussion naturally gives rise to the question
how it is that Scripture in some places makes use of
the term vij/n/ana when meaning the individual soul.
The answer is given in Sutra 29, ’The soul is
designated as knowledge because it has that quality
for its essence,’ i.e. because knowledge
is the essential characteristic quality of the soul,
therefore the term ‘knowledge’ is employed
here and there to denote the soul itself. This
latter interpretation gives rise to no doubt whatever.
It closely follows the wording of the text and does
not necessitate any forced supplementation. The
‘tu’ of the Sutra which, according to
Sa@nkara, is meant to discard the purvapaksha,
serves on Ramanuja’s view to set aside a previously-raised
objection; an altogether legitimate assumption.