The Lord, we reply, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty, “because he is bound by regards.”  If the Lord on his own account, without any extraneous regards, produced this unequal creation, he would expose himself to blame; but the fact is, that in creating he is bound by certain regards, i.e. he has to look to merit and demerit.  Hence the circumstance of the creation being unequal is due to the merit and demerit of the living creatures created, and is not a fault for which the Lord is to blame.  The position of the Lord is to be looked on as analogous to that of Parjanya, the Giver of rain.  For as Parjanya is the common cause of the production of rice, barley, and other plants, while the difference between the various species is due to the various potentialities lying hidden in the respective seeds, so the Lord is the common cause of the creation of gods, men, &c., while the differences between these classes of beings are due to the different merit belonging to the individual souls.  Hence the Lord, being bound by regards, cannot be reproached with inequality of dispensation and cruelty.—­And if we are asked how we come to know that the Lord, in creating this world with its various conditions, is bound by regards, we reply that Scripture declares that; compare, for instance, the two following passages, ’For he (the Lord) makes him, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do a good deed; and the same makes him, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do a bad deed’ (Kaush.  Up.  III, 8)[312]; and, ’A man becomes good by good work, bad by bad work’ (B/ri/.  Up.  III, 2, 13).  Sm/ri/ti passages also declare the favour of the Lord and its opposite to depend on the different quality of the works of living beings; so, for instance, ‘I serve men in the way in which they approach me’ (Bha.  Gi.  IV, 11).

35.  If it be objected that it (viz. the Lord’s having regard to merit and demerit) is impossible on account of the non-distinction (of merit and demerit, previous to the first creation); we refute the objection on the ground of (the world) being without a beginning.

But—­an objection is raised—­the passage, ’Being only this was in the beginning, one, without a second,’ affirms that before the creation there was no distinction and consequently no merit on account of which the creation might have become unequal.  And if we assume the Lord to have been guided in his dispensations by the actions of living beings subsequent to the creation, we involve ourselves in the circular reasoning that work depends on diversity of condition of life, and diversity of condition again on work.  The Lord may be considered as acting with regard to religious merit after distinction had once arisen; but as before that the cause of inequality, viz. merit, did not exist, it follows that the first creation must have been free, from inequalities.

This objection we meet by the remark, that the transmigratory world is without beginning.—­The objection would be valid if the world had a beginning; but as it is without beginning, merit and inequality are, like seed and sprout, caused as well as causes, and there is therefore no logical objection to their operation.—­To the question how we know that the world is without a beginning, the next Sutra replies.