33.  But (Brahman’s creative activity) is mere sport, such as we see in ordinary life.

The word ‘but’ discards the objection raised.—­We see in every-day life that certain doings of princes or other men of high position who have no unfulfilled desires left have no reference to any extraneous purpose; but proceed from mere sportfulness, as, for instance, their recreations in places of amusement.  We further see that the process of inhalation and exhalation is going on without reference to any extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature.  Analogously, the activity of the Lord also may be supposed to be mere sport, proceeding from his own nature[310], without reference to any purpose.  For on the ground neither of reason nor of Scripture can we construe any other purpose of the Lord.  Nor can his nature be questioned.[311]—­Although the creation of this world appears to us a weighty and difficult undertaking, it is mere play to the Lord, whose power is unlimited.  And if in ordinary life we might possibly, by close scrutiny, detect some subtle motive, even for sportful action, we cannot do so with regard to the actions of the Lord, all whose wishes are fulfilled, as Scripture says.—­Nor can it be said that he either does not act or acts like a senseless person; for Scripture affirms the fact of the creation on the one hand, and the Lord’s omniscience on the other hand.  And, finally, we must remember that the scriptural doctrine of creation does not refer to the highest reality; it refers to the apparent world only, which is characterised by name and form, the figments of Nescience, and it, moreover, aims at intimating that Brahman is the Self of everything.

34.  Inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty (the Lord can) not (be reproached with), on account of his regarding (merit and demerit); for so (Scripture) declares.

In order to strengthen the tenet which we are at present defending, we follow the procedure of him who shakes a pole planted in the ground (in order to test whether it is firmly planted), and raise another objection against the doctrine of the Lord being the cause of the world.—­The Lord, it is said, cannot be the cause of the world, because, on that hypothesis, the reproach of inequality of dispensation and cruelty would attach to him.  Some beings, viz. the gods and others, he renders eminently happy; others, as for instance the animals, eminently unhappy; to some again, as for instance men, he allots an intermediate position.  To a Lord bringing about such an unequal condition of things, passion and malice would have to be ascribed, just as to any common person acting similarly; which attributes would be contrary to the essential goodness of the Lord affirmed by Sruti and Sm/ri/ti.  Moreover, as the infliction of pain and the final destruction of all creatures would form part of his dispensation, he would have to be taxed with great cruelty, a quality abhorred by low people even.  For these two reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.