Adhik.  XII (18) defines the nature of the individual soul.  The Sutra declares that the soul is ‘j/n/a.’  This means, according to Sa@nkara, that intelligence or knowledge does not, as the Vai/s/eshikas teach, constitute a mere attribute of the soul which in itself is essentially non-intelligent, but is the very essence of the soul.  The soul is not a knower, but knowledge; not intelligent, but intelligence.—­Ramanuja, on the other hand, explains ‘j/n/a’ by ‘j/n/at/ri/,’ i.e. knower, knowing agent, and considers the Sutra to be directed not only against the Vai/s/eshikas, but also against those philosophers who—­like the Sa@nkhyas and the Vedantins of Sa@nkara’s school—­maintain that the soul is not a knowing agent, but pure kaitanya.—­The wording of the Sutra certainly seems to favour Ramanuja’s interpretation; we can hardly imagine that an author definitely holding the views of Sa@nkara should, when propounding the important dogma of the soul’s nature, use the term j/n/a of which the most obvious interpretation j/n/at/ri/, not j/n/anam.

Adhik.  XIII (19-32) treats the question whether the individual soul is a/n/u, i.e. of very minute size, or omnipresent, all-pervading (sarvagata, vyapin).  Here, again, we meet with diametrically opposite views.—­In Sa@nkara’s opinion the Sutras 19-38 represent the purvapaksha view, according to which the jiva is a/n/u, while Sutra 29 formulates the siddhanta, viz. that the jiva, which in reality is all-pervading, is spoken of as a/n/u in some scriptural passages, because the qualities of the internal organ—­which itself is a/n/u—­constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in the sa/m/sara.—­According to Ramanuja, on the other hand, the first Sutra of the adhikara/n/a gives utterance to the siddhanta view, according to which the soul is of minute size; the Sutras 20-25 confirm this view and refute objections raised against it; while the Sutras 26-29 resume the question already mooted under Sutra 18, viz. in what relation the soul as knowing agent (j/n/at/ri/) stands to knowledge (j/n/ana).—­In order to decide between the conflicting claims of these two interpretations we must enter into some details.—­Sa@nkara maintains that Sutras 19-28 state and enforce a purvapaksha view, which is finally refuted in 29.  What here strikes us at the outset, is the unusual length to which the defence of a mere prima facie view is carried; in no other place the Sutras take so much trouble to render plausible what is meant to be rejected in the end, and an unbiassed reader will certainly feel inclined to think that in 19-28 we have to do, not with the preliminary statement of a view finally to be abandoned, but with an elaborate bona fide attempt to establish and vindicate an essential dogma of the system.  Still it is not altogether impossible that the purvapaksha should here be treated at greater length than usual, and the decisive point is therefore