Brahman does not exist (on that hypothesis).  Moreover, the possibility of Brahman becoming the object of perception by means of the senses is denied while its effects may thus be perceived.  For these reasons the existence of an unmodified Brahman has to be admitted.—­Nor do we violate those texts which declare Brahman to be without parts; we rather admit Brahman to be without parts just because Scripture reveals it.  For Brahman which rests exclusively on the holy texts, and regarding which the holy texts alone are authoritative—­not the senses, and so on—­must be accepted such as the texts proclaim it to be.  Now those texts declare, on the one hand, that not the entire Brahman passes over into its effects, and, on the other hand, that Brahman is without parts.  Even certain ordinary things such as gems, spells, herbs, and the like possess powers which, owing to difference of time, place, occasion, and so on, produce various opposite effects, and nobody unaided by instruction is able to find out by mere reflection the number of these powers, their favouring conditions, their objects, their purposes, &c.; how much more impossible is it to conceive without the aid of Scripture the true nature of Brahman with its powers unfathomable by thought!  As the Pura/n/a says:  ’Do not apply reasoning to what is unthinkable!  The mark of the unthinkable is that it is above all material causes[304].’  Therefore the cognition of what is supersensuous is based on the holy texts only.

But—­our opponent will say—­even the holy texts cannot make us understand what is contradictory.  Brahman, you say, which is without parts undergoes a change, but not the entire Brahman.  If Brahman is without parts, it does either not change at all or it changes in its entirety.  If, on the other hand, it be said that it changes partly and persists partly, a break is effected in its nature, and from that it follows that it consists of parts.  It is true that in matters connected with action (as, for instance, in the case of the two Vedic injunctions ‘at the atiratra he is to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup,’ and ’at the atiratra he is not to take the sho/d/a/s/in-cup’) any contradiction which may present itself to the understanding is removed by the optional adoption of one of the two alternatives presented as action is dependent on man; but in the case under discussion the adoption of one of the alternatives does not remove the contradiction because an existent thing (like Brahman) does not (like an action which is to be accomplished) depend on man.  We are therefore met here by a real difficulty.