This objection of yours, we reply, is without any force, on account of its being a mere negation.  If you negative the existence of the effect previous to its actual origination, your negation is a mere negation without an object to be negatived.  The negation (implied in ‘non-existent’) can certainly not have for its object the existence of the effect previous to its origination, since the effect must be viewed as ‘existent,’ through and in the Self of the cause, before its origination as well as after it; for at the present moment also this effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause; according to such scriptural passages as, ’Whosoever looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self is abandoned by everything’ (B/ri/.  Up.  II, 4, 6).  In so far, on the other hand, as the effect exists through the Self of the cause, its existence is the same before the actual beginning of the effect (as after it).—­But Brahman, which is devoid of qualities such as sound, &c., is the cause of this world (possessing all those qualities)!—­True, but the effect with all its qualities does not exist without the Self of the cause either now or before the actual beginning (of the effect); hence it cannot be said that (according to our doctrine) the effect is non-existing before its actual beginning.—­This point will be elucidated in detail in the section treating of the non-difference of cause and effect.

8.  On account of such consequences at the time of reabsorption (the doctrine maintained hitherto) is objectionable.

The purvapakshin raises further objections.—­If an effect which is distinguished by the qualities of grossness, consisting of parts, absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, &c., is admitted to have Brahman for its cause, it follows that at the time of reabsorption (of the world into Brahman), the effect, by entering into the state of non-division from its cause, inquinates the latter with its properties.  As therefore—­on your doctrine—­the cause (i.e.  Brahman) as well as the effect is, at the time of reabsorption, characterised by impurity and similar qualities, the doctrine of the Upanishads, according to which an omniscient Brahman is the cause of the world, cannot be upheld.—­Another objection to that doctrine is that in consequence of all distinctions passing at the time of reabsorption into the state of non-distinction there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of the world, and consequently the new world could not arise with all the distinctions of enjoying souls, objects to be enjoyed and so on (which are actually observed to exist).—­A third objection is that, if we assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all works, &c. (which are the causes of a new world arising) of the enjoying souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the highest Brahman, we are led to the conclusion that also those (souls) which have obtained final release again appear in the new world.—­If you finally say, ’Well, let this world remain distinct from the highest Brahman even at the time of reabsorption,’ we reply that in that case a reabsorption will not take place at all, and that, moreover, the effect’s existing separate from the cause is not possible.—­For all these reasons the Vedanta doctrine is objectionable.