There are also the following Sm/ri/ti passages to the same effect:  ’Do not apply reasoning to those things which are uncognisable[269];’ ‘Unevolved he is called, uncognisable, unchangeable;’ ’Not the legions of the gods know my origin, not the great rishis.  For I myself am in every way the origin of the gods and great rishis’ (Bha.  Gi.  X, 2).—­And if it has been maintained above that the scriptural passage enjoining thought (on Brahman) in addition to mere hearing (of the sacred texts treating of Brahman) shows that reasoning also is to be allowed its place, we reply that the passage must not deceitfully be taken as enjoining bare independent ratiocination, but must be understood to represent reasoning as a subordinate auxiliary of intuitional knowledge.  By reasoning of the latter type we may, for instance, arrive at the following conclusions; that because the state of dream and the waking state exclude each other the Self is not connected with those states; that, as the soul in the state of deep sleep leaves the phenomenal world behind and becomes one with that whose Self is pure Being, it has for its Self pure Being apart from the phenomenal world; that as the world springs from Brahman it cannot be separate from Brahman, according to the principle of the non-difference of cause and effect, &c.[270] The fallaciousness of mere reasoning will moreover be demonstrated later on (II, 1, 11).—­He[271], moreover, who merely on the ground of the sacred tradition about an intelligent cause of the world would assume this entire world to be of an intellectual nature would find room for the other scriptural passage quoted above (’He became knowledge and what is devoid of knowledge’) which teaches a distinction of intellect and non-intellect; for he could avail himself of the doctrine of intellect being sometimes manifested and sometimes non-manifested.  His antagonist, on the other hand (i.e. the Sa@nkhya), would not be able to make anything of the passage, for it distinctly teaches that the highest cause constitutes the Self of the entire world.

If, then, on account of difference of character that which is intelligent cannot pass over into what is non-intelligent, that also which is non-intelligent (i.e. in our case, the non-intelligent pradhana of the Sa@nkhyas) cannot pass over into what is intelligent.—­(So much for argument’s sake,) but apart from that, as the argument resting on difference of character has already been refuted, we must assume an intelligent cause of the world in agreement with Scripture.

7.  If (it is said that the effect is) non-existent (before its origination); we do not allow that because it is a mere negation (without an object).

If Brahman, which is intelligent, pure, and devoid of qualities such as sound, and so on, is supposed to be the cause of an effect which is of an opposite nature, i.e. non-intelligent, impure, possessing the qualities of sound, &c., it follows that the effect has to be considered as non-existing before its actual origination.  But this consequence cannot be acceptable to you—­the Vedantin—­who maintain the doctrine of the effect existing in the cause already.