being the effect of another), the relation of material cause and effect (which after all requires a distinction of the two) would be annihilated.  If, again, it be remarked that in the case of men and hair as well as in that of scorpions and cow-dung there is one characteristic feature, at least, which is found in the effect as well as in the cause, viz. the quality of being of an earthy nature; we reply that in the case of Brahman and the world also one characteristic feature, viz. that of existence (satta), is found in ether, &c. (which are the effects) as well as in Brahman (which is the cause).—­He, moreover, who on the ground of the difference of the attributes tries to invalidate the doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world, must assert that he understands by difference of attributes either the non-occurrence (in the world) of the entire complex of the characteristics of Brahman, or the non-occurrence of any (some or other) characteristic, or the non-occurrence of the characteristic of intelligence.  The first assertion would lead to the negation of the relation of cause and effect in general, which relation is based on the fact of there being in the effect something over and above the cause (for if the two were absolutely identical they could not be distinguished).  The second assertion is open to the charge of running counter to what is well known; for, as we have already remarked, the characteristic quality of existence which belongs to Brahman is found likewise in ether and so on.  For the third assertion the requisite proving instances are wanting; for what instances could be brought forward against the upholder of Brahman, in order to prove the general assertion that whatever is devoid of intelligence is seen not to be an effect of Brahman? (The upholder of Brahman would simply not admit any such instances) because he maintains that this entire complex of things has Brahman for its material cause.  And that all such assertions are contrary to Scripture, is clear, as we have already shown it to be the purport of Scripture that Brahman is the cause and substance of the world.  It has indeed been maintained by the purvapakshin that the other means of proof also (and not merely sacred tradition) apply to Brahman, on account of its being an accomplished entity (not something to be accomplished as religious duties are); but such an assertion is entirely gratuitous.  For Brahman, as being devoid of form and so on, cannot become an object of perception; and as there are in its case no characteristic marks (on which conclusions, &c. might be based), inference also and the other means of proof do not apply to it; but, like religious duty, it is to be known solely on the ground of holy tradition.  Thus Scripture also declares, ’That doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but when it is declared by another then, O dearest! it is easy to understand’ (Ka.  Up.  I, 2, 9).  And again, ’Who in truth knows it?  Who could here proclaim it, whence this creation sprang?’ (Rig-v.  Sa/m/h.  X, 129, 6).  These two mantras show that the cause of this world is not to be known even by divine beings (i/s/vara)[268] of extraordinary power and wisdom.