it will be said, an intelligent instrument also might be subservient to the enjoying soul; just as an intelligent servant is subservient to his master.—­This analogy, we reply, does not hold good, because in the case of servant and master also only the non-intelligent element in the former is subservient to the intelligent master.  For a being endowed with intelligence subserves another intelligent being only with the non-intelligent part belonging to it, viz. its internal organ, sense organs, &c.; while in so far as it is intelligent itself it acts neither for nor against any other being.  For the Sa@nkhyas are of opinion that the intelligent beings (i.e. the souls) are incapable of either taking in or giving out anything[265], and are non-active.  Hence that only which is devoid of intelligence can be an instrument.  Nor[266] is there anything to show that things like pieces of wood and clods of earth are of an intelligent nature; on the contrary, the dichotomy of all things which exist into such as are intelligent and such as are non-intelligent is well established.  This world therefore cannot have its material cause in Brahman from which it is altogether different in character.—­Here somebody might argue as follows.  Scripture tells us that this world has originated from an intelligent cause; therefore, starting from the observation that the attributes of the cause survive in the effect, I assume this whole world to be intelligent.  The absence of manifestation of intelligence (in this world) is to be ascribed to the particular nature of the modification[267].  Just as undoubtedly intelligent beings do not manifest their intelligence in certain states such as sleep, swoon, &c., so the intelligence of wood and earth also is not manifest (although it exists).  In consequence of this difference produced by the manifestation and non-manifestation of intelligence (in the case of men, animals, &c., on the one side, and wood, stones, &c. on the other side), and in consequence of form, colour, and the like being present in the one case and absent in the other, nothing prevents the instruments of action (earth, wood, &c.) from standing to the souls in the relation of a subordinate to a superior thing, although in reality both are equally of an intelligent nature.  And just as such substances as flesh, broth, pap, and the like may, owing to their individual differences, stand in the relation of mutual subserviency, although fundamentally they are all of the same nature, viz. mere modifications of earth, so it will be in the case under discussion also, without there being done any violence to the well-known distinction (of beings intelligent and non-intelligent).—­This reasoning—­the purvapakshin replies—­if valid might remove to a certain extent that difference of character between Brahman and the world which is due to the circumstance of the one being intelligent and the other non-intelligent; there would, however, still remain that other difference which results from