for other means of right knowledge also, as, for instance, the case of earth and the other elements shows.  And just as in the case of several conflicting scriptural passages we explain all of them in such a manner as to make them accord with one, so Sruti, if in conflict with other means of right knowledge, has to be bent so as to accord with the letter.  Moreover, Reasoning, which enables us to infer something not actually perceived in consequence of its having a certain equality of attributes with what is actually perceived, stands nearer to perception than Sruti which conveys its sense by tradition merely.  And the knowledge of Brahman which discards Nescience and effects final release terminates in a perception (viz. the intuition—­sakshatkara—­of Brahman), and as such must be assumed to have a seen result (not an unseen one like dharma)[264].  Moreover, the scriptural passage, ’He is to be heard, to be thought,’ enjoins thought in addition to hearing, and thereby shows that Reasoning also is to be resorted to with regard to Brahman.  Hence an objection founded on Reasoning is set forth, ’Not so, on account of the difference of nature of this (effect).’—­The Vedantic opinion that the intelligent Brahman is the material cause of this world is untenable because the effect would in that case be of an altogether different character from the cause.  For this world, which the Vedantin considers as the effect of Brahman, is perceived to be non-intelligent and impure, consequently different in character from Brahman; and Brahman again is declared by the sacred texts to be of a character different from the world, viz. intelligent and pure.  But things of an altogether different character cannot stand to each other in the relation of material cause and effect.  Such effects, for instance, as golden ornaments do not have earth for their material cause, nor is gold the material cause of earthen vessels; but effects of an earthy nature originate from earth and effects of the nature of gold from gold.  In the same manner this world, which is non-intelligent and comprises pleasure, pain, and dulness, can only be the effect of a cause itself non-intelligent and made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness; but not of Brahman which is of an altogether different character.  The difference in character of this world from Brahman must be understood to be due to its impurity and its want of intelligence.  It is impure because being itself made up of pleasure, pain, and dulness, it is the cause of delight, grief, despondency, &c., and because it comprises in itself abodes of various character such as heaven, hell, and so on.  It is devoid of intelligence because it is observed to stand to the intelligent principle in the relation of subserviency, being the instrument of its activity.  For the relation of subserviency of one thing to another is not possible on the basis of equality; two lamps, for instance, cannot be said to be subservient to each other (both being equally luminous).—­But,