the Sa@nkhya and Yoga philosophers;’ that opinion is controverted ’just as there is one place of origin, (viz. the earth,) for many persons, so I will proclaim to you that universal person raised by his qualities;’ and, finally, it is declared that there is one universal Self, ’He is the internal Self of me, of thee, and of all other embodied beings, the internal witness of all, not to be apprehended by any one.  He the all-headed, all-armed, all-footed, all-eyed, all-nosed one moves through all beings according to his will and liking.’  And Scripture also declares that there is one universal Self, ’When to a man who understands the Self has become all things, what sorrow, what trouble can there be to him who once beheld that unity?’ (I/s/.  Up 7); and other similar passages.  All which proves that the system of Kapila contradicts the Veda, and the doctrine of Manu who follows the Veda, by its hypothesis of a plurality of Selfs also, not only by the assumption of an independent pradhana.  The authoritativeness of the Veda with regard to the matters stated by it is independent and direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of human dicta, on the other hand, is of an altogether different kind, as it depends on an extraneous basis (viz. the Veda), and is (not immediate but) mediated by a chain of teachers and tradition.

Hence the circumstance that the result (of our doctrine) is want of room for certain Sm/ri/tis, with regard to matters contradicted by the Veda, furnishes no valid objection.—­An additional reason for this our opinion is supplied by the following Sutra.

2.  And on account of the non-perception of the others (i.e. the effects of the pradhana, according to the Sa@nkhya system).

The principles different from the pradhana, but to be viewed as its modifications which the (Sa@nkhya) Sm/ri/ti assumes, as, for instance, the great principle, are perceived neither in the Veda nor in ordinary experience.  Now things of the nature of the elements and the sense organs, which are well known from the Veda, as well as from experience, may be referred to in Sm/ri/ti; but with regard to things which, like Kapila’s great principle, are known neither from the Veda nor from experience—­no more than, for instance, the objects of a sixth sense—­Sm/ri/ti is altogether impossible.  That some scriptural passages which apparently refer to such things as the great principle have in reality quite a different meaning has already been shown under I, 4, 1.  But if that part of Sm/ri/ti which is concerned with the effects (i.e. the great principle, and so on) is without authority, the part which refers to the cause (the pradhana) will be so likewise.  This is what the Sutra means to say.—­We have thus established a second reason, proving that the circumstance of there being no room left for certain Sm/ri/tis does not constitute a valid objection to our doctrine.—­The weakness of the trust in reasoning (apparently favouring the Sa@nkhya doctrine) will be shown later on under II, 1, 4 ff.