[Footnote 235: Indication (laksha/n/a, which consists in this case in five times five being used instead of twenty-five) is considered as an objectionable mode of expression, and therefore to be assumed in interpretation only where a term can in no way be shown to have a direct meaning.]
[Footnote 236: That pa/nk/ajana/h/ is only one word appears from its having only one accent, viz. the udatta on the last syllable, which udatta becomes anudatta according to the rules laid down in the Bhashika Sutra for the accentuation of the Satapatha-brahma/n/a.]
[Footnote 237: So in the Madhyandina recension of the Upanishad; the Ka/n/va recension has not the clause ‘the food of food.’]
[Footnote 238: This in answer to the Sankhya who objects to jana when applied to the prana, &c. being interpreted with the help of laksha/n/a; while if referred to the pradhana, &c. it may be explained to have a direct meaning, on the ground of yaugika interpretation (the pradhana being jana because it produces, the mahat &c. being jana because they are produced). The Vedantin points out that the compound pa/nk/ajana/h/ has its own ru/dh/i-meaning, just as a/s/vakar/n/a, literally horse-ear, which conventionally denotes a certain plant.]
[Footnote 239: We infer that udbhid is the name of a sacrifice because it is mentioned in connexion with the act of sacrificing; we infer that the yupa is a wooden post because it is said to be cut, and so on.]
[Footnote 240: Option being possible only in the case of things to be accomplished, i.e. actions.]
[Footnote 241: According to Go. An. in the passage, ’That made itself its Self’ (II, 7); according to An. Giri in the passage, ’He created all’ (II, 6).]
[Footnote 242: By the Brahma/n/as being meant all those Brahma/n/as who are not at the same time wandering mendicants.]
[Footnote 243: The comment of the Bhamati on the Sutra runs as follows: As the sparks issuing from a fire are not absolutely different from the fire, because they participate in the nature of the fire; and, on the other hand, are not absolutely non-different from the fire, because in that case they could be distinguished neither from the fire nor from each other; so the individual souls also—which are effects of Brahman—are neither absolutely different from Brahman, for that would mean that they are not of the nature of intelligence; nor absolutely non-different from Brahman, because in that case they could not be distinguished from each other, and because, if they were identical with Brahman and therefore omniscient, it would be useless to give them any instruction. Hence the individual souls are somehow different from Brahman and somehow non-different.—The technical name of the doctrine here represented by A/s/marathya is bhedabhedavada.]