We have proved herewith that Scripture offers no basis for the doctrine of the pradhana.  That this doctrine cannot be proved either by Sm/ri/ti or by ratiocination will be shown later on.

14. (Although there is a conflict of the Vedanta-passages with regard to the things created, such as) ether and so on; (there is no such conflict with regard to the Lord) on account of his being represented (in one passage) as described (in other passages), viz. as the cause (of the world).

In the preceding part of the work the right definition of Brahman has been established; it has been shown that all the Vedanta-texts have Brahman for their common topic; and it has been proved that there is no scriptural authority for the doctrine of the pradhana.—­But now a new objection presents itself.

It is not possible—­our opponent says—­to prove either that Brahman is the cause of the origin, &c. of the world, or that all Vedanta-texts refer to Brahman; because we observe that the Vedanta-texts contradict one another.  All the Vedanta-passages which treat of the creation enumerate its successive steps in different order, and so in reality speak of different creations.  In one place it is said that from the Self there sprang the ether (Taitt.  Up.  II, 1); in another place that the creation began with fire (Ch.  Up.  VI, 2, 3); in another place, again, that the Person created breath and from breath faith (Pr.  Up.  VI, 4); in another place, again, that the Self created these worlds, the water (above the heaven), light, the mortal (earth), and the water (below the earth) (Ait.  Ar.  II, 4, 1, 2; 3).  There no order is stated at all.  Somewhere else it is said that the creation originated from the Non-existent.  ’In the beginning this was non-existent; from it was born what exists’ (Taitt.  Up.  II, 7); and, ’In the beginning this was non-existent; it became existent; it grew’ (Ch.  Up.  III, 19, 1).  In another place, again, the doctrine of the Non-existent being the antecedent of the creation is impugned, and the Existent mentioned in its stead.  ’Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not; but how could it be thus, my dear?  How could that which is be born of that which is not?’ (Ch.  Up.  VI, 2, 1; 2.) And in another place, again, the development of the world is spoken of as having taken place spontaneously, ’Now all this was then undeveloped.  It became developed by form and name’ (B/ri/.  Up.  I, 4, 7).—­As therefore manifold discrepancies are observed, and as no option is possible in the case of an accomplished matter[240], the Vedanta-passages cannot be accepted as authorities for determining the cause of the world, but we must rather accept some other cause of the world resting on the authority of Sm/ri/ti and Reasoning.