[Footnote 193:  The first reason excludes animals, gods, and rishis.  Gods cannot themselves perform sacrifices, the essential feature of which is the parting, on the part of the sacrificer, with an offering meant for the gods. Rishis cannot perform sacrifices in the course of whose performance the ancestral rishis of the sacrificer are invoked.—­The second reason excludes those men whose only desire is emancipation and who therefore do not care for the perishable fruits of sacrifices.—­The third and fourth reasons exclude the Sudras who are indirectly disqualified for sastric works because the Veda in different places gives rules for the three higher castes only, and for whom the ceremony of the upanayana—­indispensable for all who wish to study the Veda—­is not prescribed.—­Cp.  Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras VI, 1.]

[Footnote 194:  The reference is to Purva Mima/m/sa Sutras I, 1, 5 (not to I, 2, 21, as stated in Muir’s Sanskrit Texts, III, p. 69).]

[Footnote 195:  In which classes of beings all the gods are comprised.]

[Footnote 196:  Which shows that together with the non-eternality of the thing denoted there goes the non-eternality of the denoting word.]

[Footnote 197:  Ak/ri/ti, best translated by [Greek:  eidos].]

[Footnote 198:  The purvapakshin, i.e. here the grammarian maintains, for the reasons specified further on, that there exists in the case of words a supersensuous entity called spho/t/a which is manifested by the letters of the word, and, if apprehended by the mind, itself manifests the sense of the word.  The term spho/t/a may, according as it is viewed in either of these lights, be explained as the manifestor or that which is manifested.—­The spho/t/a is a grammatical fiction, the word in so far as it is apprehended by us as a whole.  That we cannot identify it with the ‘notion’ (as Deussen seems inclined to do, p. 80) follows from its being distinctly called va/k/aka or abhidhayaka, and its being represented as that which causes the conception of the sense of a word (arthadhihetu).]

[Footnote 199:  For that each letter by itself expresses the sense is not observed; and if it did so, the other letters of the word would have to be declared useless.]

[Footnote 200:  In order to enable us to apprehend the sense from the word, there is required the actual consciousness of the last letter plus the impressions of the preceding letters; just as smoke enables us to infer the existence of fire only if we are actually conscious of the smoke.  But that actual consciousness does not take place because the impressions are not objects of perceptive consciousness.]

[Footnote 201:  ‘How should it be so?’ i.e. it cannot be so; and on that account the differences apprehended do not belong to the letters themselves, but to the external conditions mentioned above.]

[Footnote 202:  With ‘or else’ begins the exposition of the finally accepted theory as to the cause why the same letters are apprehended as different.  Hitherto the cause had been found in the variety of the upadhis of the letters.  Now a new distinction is made between articulated letters and non-articulated tone.]