We now turn to the objection (raised above by the purvapakshin) that mantras and arthavadas, as merely subserving other purposes, have no power of setting forth the personality of the devas, and remark that not the circumstance of subordination or non-subordination to some other purpose, but rather the presence or absence of a certain idea furnishes a reason for (our assuming) the existence of something.  This is exemplified by the case of a person who, having set out for some other purpose, (nevertheless) forms the conviction of the existence of leaves, grass, and the like, which he sees lying on the road.—­But, the purvapakshin may here object, the instance quoted by you is not strictly analogous.  In the case of the wanderer, perception, whose objects the grass and leaves are, is active, and through it he forms the conception of their existence.  In the case of an arthavada, on the other hand, which, as forming a syntactical unity with the corresponding injunctory passage, merely subserves the purpose of glorifying (the latter), it is impossible to determine any energy having a special object of its own.  For in general any minor syntactical unity, which is included in a more comprehensive syntactical unity conveying a certain meaning, does not possess the power of expressing a separate meaning of its own.  Thus, for instance, we derive, from the combination of the three words constituting the negative sentence, ‘(Do) not drink wine,’ one meaning only, i.e. a prohibition of drinking wine, and do not derive an additional meaning, viz. an order to drink wine, from the combination of the last two words, ’drink wine.’—­To this objection we reply, that the instance last quoted is not analogous (to the matter under discussion).  The words of the sentence prohibiting the drinking of wine form only one whole, and on that account the separate sense which any minor syntactical unity included in the bigger sentence may possess cannot be accepted.  In the case of injunction and arthavada, on the other hand, the words constituting the arthavada form a separate group of their own which refers to some accomplished thing[214], and only subsequently to that, when it comes to be considered what purpose they subserve, they enter on the function of glorifying the injunction.  Let us examine, as an illustrative example, the injunctive passage, ’He who is desirous of prosperity is to offer to Vayu a white animal.’  All the words contained in this passage are directly connected with the injunction.  This is, however, not the case with the words constituting the corresponding arthavada passage, ’For Vayu is the swiftest deity; Vayu he approaches with his own share; he leads him to prosperity.’  The single words of this arthavada are not grammatically connected with the single words of the injunction, but form a subordinate unity of their own, which contains the praise of Vayu, and glorify the injunction, only in so far as they give us to understand that the action enjoined is connected