more than one cannot form the object of one act of apprehension.—­As that spho/t/a is recognised as the same as often as the word is pronounced, it is eternal; while the apprehension of difference referred to above has for its object the letters merely.  From this eternal word, which is of the nature of the spho/t/a and possesses denotative power, there is produced the object denoted, i.e. this world which consists of actions, agents, and results of action.

Against this doctrine the reverend Upavarsha maintains that the letters only are the word.—­But—­an objection is raised—­it has been said above that the letters no sooner produced pass away!—­That assertion is not true, we reply; for they are recognised as the same letters (each time they are produced anew).—­Nor can it be maintained that the recognition is due to similarity only, as in the case of hairs, for instance; for the fact of the recognition being a recognition in the strict sense of the word is not contradicted by any other means of proof.—­Nor, again, can it be said that the recognition has its cause in the species (so that not the same individual letter would be recognised, but only a letter belonging to the same species as other letters heard before); for, as a matter of fact, the same individual letters are recognised.  That the recognition of the letters rests on the species could be maintained only if whenever the letters are pronounced different individual letters were apprehended, just as several cows are apprehended as different individuals belonging to the same species.  But this is actually not the case; for the (same) individual letters are recognised as often as they are pronounced.  If, for instance, the word cow is pronounced twice, we think not that two different words have been pronounced, but that the same individual word has been repeated.—­But, our opponent reminds us, it has been shown above, that the letters are apprehended as different owing to differences of pronunciation, as appears from the fact that we apprehend a difference when merely hearing the sound of Devadatta or Yaj/n/adatta reading.—­Although, we reply, it is a settled matter that the letters are recognised as the same, yet we admit that there are differences in the apprehension of the letters; but as the letters are articulated by means of the conjunction and disjunction (of the breath with the palate, the teeth, &c.), those differences are rightly ascribed to the various character of the articulating agents and not to the intrinsic nature of the letters themselves.  Those, moreover, who maintain that the individual letters are different have, in order to account for the fact of recognition, to assume species of letters, and further to admit that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors.  Is it then not much simpler to assume, as we do, that the apprehension of difference is conditioned by external factors while the recognition is due to the intrinsic nature of the letters?  And this very fact of recognition