3.  On the other hand, as (those qualities) are not possible (in it), the embodied (soul is) not (denoted by manomaya, &c.).

The preceding Sutra has declared that the qualities mentioned are possible in Brahman; the present Sutra states that they are not possible in the embodied Self.  Brahman only possesses, in the manner explained, the qualities of consisting of mind, and so on; not the embodied individual soul.  For qualities such as expressed in the words, ’He whose purposes are true, whose Self is the ether, who has no speech, who is not disturbed, who is greater than the earth,’ cannot easily be attributed to the embodied Self.  By the term ‘embodied’ (sarira) we have to understand ‘residing’ in a body.  If it be objected that the Lord also resides in the body[139], we reply, True, he does reside in the body, but not in the body only; for sruti declares him to be all-pervading; compare, ’He is greater than the earth; greater than the atmosphere, omnipresent like the ether, eternal.’  The individual soul, on the other hand, is in the body only, apart from which as the abode of fruition it does not exist.

4.  And because there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent.

The attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot belong to the embodied Self for that reason also, that there is a (separate) denotation of the object of activity and of the agent.  In the passage, ‘When I shall have departed from hence I shall obtain him’ (Ch.  Up.  III, 14, 4), the word ‘him’ refers to that which is the topic of discussion, viz. the Self which is to be meditated upon as possessing the attributes of consisting of mind, &c., as the object of an activity, viz. as something to be obtained; while the words, ‘I shall obtain,’ represent the meditating individual Self as the agent, i.e. the obtainer.  Now, wherever it can be helped, we must not assume that one and the same being is spoken of as the agent and the object of the activity at the same time.  The relation existing between a person meditating and the thing meditated upon requires, moreover, different abodes.—­And thus for the above reason, also, that which is characterised by the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul.

5.  On account of the difference of words.

That which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind, and so on, cannot be the individual soul, for that reason also that there is a difference of words.

That is to say, we meet with another scriptural passage of kindred subject-matter (Sat.  Bra.  X, 6, 3, 2), ’Like a rice grain, or a barley grain, or a canary seed or the kernel of a canary seed, thus that golden person is in the Self.’  There one word, i.e. the locative ‘in the Self,’ denotes the embodied Self, and a different word, viz. the nominative ‘person,’ denotes the Self distinguished by the qualities of consisting of mind, &c.  We therefrom conclude that the two are different.