[Footnote 37:  ‘The body, &c. is my Self;’ ’sickness, death, children, wealth, &c., belong to my Self.’]

[Footnote 38:  Literally ‘in some other place.’  The clause ’in the form of remembrance’ is added, the Bhamati remarks, in order to exclude those cases where something previously observed is recognised in some other thing or place; as when, for instance, the generic character of a cow which was previously observed in a black cow again presents itself to consciousness in a grey cow, or when Devadatta whom we first saw in Pa/t/aliputra again appears before us in Mahishmati.  These are cases of recognition where the object previously observed again presents itself to our senses; while in mere remembrance the object previously perceived is not in renewed contact with the senses.  Mere remembrance operates in the case of adhyasa, as when we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver which is at the time not present but remembered only.]

[Footnote 39:  The so-called anyathakhyativadins maintain that in the act of adhyasa the attributes of one thing, silver for instance, are superimposed on a different thing existing in a different place, mother-of-pearl for instance (if we take for our example of adhyasa the case of some man mistaking a piece of mother-of-pearl before him for a piece of silver).  The atmakhyativadins maintain that in adhyasa the modification, in the form of silver, of the internal organ and action which characterise transmigratory existence have existed, with the latter, from all eternity.]

[Footnote 40:  This is the definition of the akhyativadins.]

[Footnote 41:  Some anyathakhyativadins and the Madhyamikas according to Ananda Giri.]

[Footnote 42:  The pratyagatman is in reality non-object, for it is svayampraka/s/a, self-luminous, i.e. the subjective factor in all cognition.  But it becomes the object of the idea of the Ego in so far as it is limited, conditioned by its adjuncts which are the product of Nescience, viz. the internal organ, the senses and the subtle and gross bodies, i.e. in so far as it is jiva, individual or personal soul.  Cp.  Bhamati, pp. 22, 23:  ’kidatmaiva svayampraka/s/oszpi buddhyadivishayavi/kkh/ura/n/at katha/mk/id asm upratyayavishayoszha/m/karaspada/m/ jiva iti ka jantur iti ka ksheuajna iti kakhyayate.’]

[Footnote 43:  Translated according to the Bhamati.  We deny, the objector says, the possibility of adhyasa in the case of the Self, not on the ground that it is not an object because self-luminous (for that it may be an object although it is self-luminous you have shown), but on the ground that it is not an object because it is not manifested either by itself or by anything else.—­It is known or manifest, the Vedantin replies, on account of its immediate presentation (aparokshatvat), i.e. on account of the intuitional knowledge we have of it.  Ananda Giri construes the above clause in a different way:  asmatpratyayavishayatveszpy aparokshatvad ekantenavishayatvabbavat tasminn aha@nkaradyadhyasa ity artha/h/.  Aparokshatvam api kai/sk/id atmano nesh/t/am ity asa@nkyaha pratyagatmeti.]