than others, touch on the essential points of the Vedanta system.  This will best be done in connexion with a succinct but full review of the topics discussed in the adhikara/n/as of the Vedanta-sutras, according to Sa@nkara; a review which—­apart from the side-glances at Ramanuja’s comments—­will be useful as a guide through the Sutras and the Sa@nkara-bhashya.  Before, however, entering on that task, I think it advisable to insert short sketches of the philosophical systems of Sa@nkara as well as of Ramanuja, which may be referred to when, later on discrepancies between the two commentators will be noted.  In these sketches I shall confine myself to the leading features, and not enter into any details.  Of Sa@nkara’s system we possess as it is more than one trustworthy exposition; it may suffice to refer to Deussen’s System of the Vedanta, in which the details of the entire system, as far as they can be learned from the Sutra-bhashya, are represented fully and faithfully, and to Gough’s Philosophy of the Upanishads which, principally in its second chapter, gives a lucid sketch of the Sa@nkara Vedanta, founded on the Sutra-bhashya, the Upanishad bhashyas, and some later writers belonging to Sa@nkara’s school.  With regard to Ramanuja’s philosophy our chief source was, hitherto, the Ramanuja chapter in the Sarvadar/s/a/n/asa/m/graha; the short sketch about to be given is founded altogether on the Sri-bhashya itself.

What in Sa@nkara’s opinion the Upanishads teach, is shortly as follows.—­Whatever is, is in reality one; there truly exists only one universal being called Brahman or Paramatman, the highest Self.  This being is of an absolutely homogeneous nature; it is pure ‘Being,’ or, which comes to the same, pure intelligence or thought (kaitanya, j/n/ana).  Intelligence or thought is not to be predicated of Brahman as its attribute, but constitutes its substance, Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself.  It is absolutely destitute of qualities; whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable, can only be denied of it.—­But, if nothing exists but one absolutely simple being, whence the appearance of the world by which we see ourselves surrounded, and, in which we ourselves exist as individual beings?—­Brahman, the answer runs, is associated with a certain power called Maya or avidya to which the appearance of this entire world is due.  This power cannot be called ‘being’ (sat), for ‘being’ is only Brahman; nor can it be called ‘non-being’ (asat) in the strict sense, for it at any rate produces the appearance of this world.  It is in fact a principle of illusion; the undefinable cause owing to which there seems to exist a material world comprehending distinct individual existences.  Being associated with this principle of illusion, Brahman is enabled to project the appearance of the world, in the same way as a magician is enabled by his incomprehensible magical power to produce illusory appearances of animate and inanimate beings.  Maya thus constitutes the upadana, the material cause of the world; or—­if we wish to call attention to the circumstance that Maya belongs to Brahman as a sakti—­we may say that the material cause of the world is Brahman in so far as it is associated with Maya.  In this latter quality Brahman is more properly called I/s/vara, the Lord.