contrivances destructive to the best and most valuable interests of the people.  Our political architects have taken a survey of the fabric of the British Constitution.  It is singular that they report nothing against the crown, nothing against the lords:  but in the House of Commons everything is unsound; it is ruinous in every part; it is infested by the dry rot, and ready to tumble about our ears without their immediate help.  You know by the faults they find what are their ideas of the alteration.  As all government stands upon opinion, they know that the way utterly to destroy it is to remove that opinion, to take away all reverence, all confidence from it; and then, at the first blast of public discontent and popular tumult, it tumbles to the ground.

In considering this question, they who oppose it oppose it on different grounds.  One is in the nature of a previous question:  that some alterations may be expedient, but that this is not the time for making them.  The other is, that no essential alterations are at all wanting, and that neither now nor at any time is it prudent or safe to be meddling with the fundamental principles and ancient tried usages of our Constitution,—­that our representation is as nearly perfect as the necessary imperfection of human affairs and of human creatures will suffer it to be,—­and that it is a subject of prudent and honest use and thankful enjoyment, and not of captious criticism and rash experiment.

On the other side there are two parties, who proceed on two grounds, in my opinion, as they state them, utterly irreconcilable.  The one is juridical, the other political.  The one is in the nature of a claim of right, on the supposed rights of man as man:  this party desire the decision of a suit.  The other ground, as far as I can divine what it directly means, is, that the representation is not so politically framed as to answer the theory of its institution.  As to the claim of right, the meanest petitioner, the most gross and ignorant, is as good as the best:  in some respects his claim is more favorable, on account of his ignorance; his weakness, his poverty, and distress only add to his titles; he sues in forma pauperis; he ought to be a favorite of the court.  But when the other ground is taken, when the question is political, when a new constitution is to be made on a sound theory of government, then the presumptuous pride of didactic ignorance is to be excluded from the counsel in this high and arduous matter, which often bids defiance to the experience of the wisest.  The first claims a personal representation; the latter rejects it with scorn and fervor.  The language of the first party is plain and intelligible; they who plead an absolute right cannot be satisfied with anything short of personal representation, because all natural rights must be the rights of individuals, as by nature there is no such thing as politic or corporate personality:  all these ideas are