All are agreed that Parliaments should not be perpetual; the only question is, What is the most convenient time for their duration?—­on which there are three opinions.  We are agreed, too, that the term ought not to be chosen most likely in its operation to spread corruption, and to augment the already overgrown influence of the crown.  On these principles I mean to debate the question.  It is easy to pretend a zeal for liberty.  Those who think themselves not likely to be incumbered with the performance of their promises, either from their known inability or total indifference about the performance, never fail to entertain the most lofty ideas.  They are certainly the most specious; and they cost them neither reflection to frame, nor pains to modify, nor management to support.  The task is of another nature to those who mean to promise nothing that it is not in their intention, or may possibly be in their power to perform,—­to those who are bound and principled no more to delude the understandings than to violate the liberty of their fellow-subjects.  Faithful watchmen we ought to be over the rights and privileges of the people.  But our duty, if we are qualified for it as we ought, is to give them information, and not to receive it from them:  we are not to go to school to them, to learn the principles of law and government.  In doing so, we should not dutifully serve, but we should basely and scandalously betray the people, who are not capable of this service by nature, nor in any instance called to it by the Constitution.  I reverentially look up to the opinion of the people, and with an awe that is almost superstitious.  I should be ashamed to show my face before them, if I changed my ground as they cried up or cried down men or things or opinions,—­if I wavered and shifted about with every change, and joined in it or opposed as best answered any low interest or passion,—­if I held them up hopes which I knew I never intended, or promised what I well knew I could not perform.  Of all these things they are perfect sovereign judges without appeal; but as to the detail of particular measures, or to any general schemes of policy, they have neither enough of speculation in the closet nor of experience in business to decide upon it.  They can well see whether we are tools of a court or their honest servants.  Of that they can well judge,—­and I wish that they always exercised their judgment; but of the particular merits of a measure I have other standards....

That the frequency of elections proposed by this bill has a tendency to increase the power and consideration of the electors, not lessen corruptibility, I do most readily allow:  so far it is desirable.  This is what it has:  I will tell you now what it has not. 1st.  It has no sort of tendency to increase their integrity and public spirit, unless an increase of power has an operation upon voters in elections, that it has in no other situation in the world, and upon no other part of mankind. 2nd.  This bill