converted the establishment into tyranny; it subverted its foundations from that very hour.  Zealous as I am for the principle of an establishment, so just an abhorrence do I conceive against whatever may shake it.  I know nothing but the supposed necessity of persecution that can make an establishment disgusting.  I would have toleration a part of establishment, as a principle favorable to Christianity, and as a part of Christianity.

All seem agreed that the law, as it stands, inflicting penalties on all-religious teachers and on schoolmasters who do not sign the Thirty-Nine Articles of Religion, ought not to be executed.  We are all agreed that the law is not good:  for that, I presume, is undoubtedly the idea of a law that ought not to be executed.  The question, therefore, is, whether in a well-constituted commonwealth, which we desire ours to be thought, and I trust intend that it should be, whether in such a commonwealth it is wise to retain those laws which it is not proper to execute.  A penal law not ordinarily put in execution seems to me to be a very absurd and a very dangerous thing.  For if its principle be right, if the object of its prohibitions and penalties be a real evil, then you do in effect permit that very evil, which not only the reason of the thing, but your very law, declares ought not to be permitted; and thus it reflects exceedingly on the wisdom, and consequently derogates not a little from the authority, of a legislature who can at once forbid and suffer, and in the same breath promulgate penalty and indemnity to the same persons and for the very same actions.  But if the object of the law be no moral or political evil, then you ought not to hold even a terror to those whom you ought certainly not to punish:  for if it is not right to hurt, it is neither right nor wise to menace.  Such laws, therefore, as they must be defective either in justice or wisdom or both, so they cannot exist without a considerable degree of danger.  Take them which way you will, they are pressed with ugly alternatives.

1st.  All penal laws are either upon popular prosecution, or on the part of the crown.  Now if they may be roused from their sleep, whenever a minister thinks proper, as instruments of oppression, then they put vast bodies of men into a state of slavery and court dependence; since their liberty of conscience and their power of executing their functions depend entirely on his will.  I would have no man derive his means of continuing any function, or his being restrained from it, but from the laws only:  they should be his only superior and sovereign lords.

2nd.  They put statesmen and magistrates into an habit of playing fast and loose with the laws, straining or relaxing them as may best suit their political purposes,—­and in that light tend to corrupt the executive power through all its offices.

3rd.  If they are taken up on popular actions, their operation in that light also is exceedingly evil.  They become the instruments of private malice, private avarice, and not of public regulation; they nourish the worst of men to the prejudice of the best, punishing tender consciences, and rewarding informers.