General Lake says:  “On the afternoon of March 7th, General Aylmer assembled his subordinate commanders and gave his final instructions, laying particular stress on the fact that the operation was designed to effect a surprise, and that to prevent the enemy forestalling us, it was essential that the first phase of the operation should be pushed through with the utmost vigor.  His dispositions were, briefly, as follows:  The greater part of a division under General Younghusband, assisted by naval gunboats, controlled the enemy on the left bank.  The remaining troops were formed into two columns, under General Kemball and General Keary respectively, a reserve of infantry, and the cavalry brigade, being held at the Corps Commander’s own disposal.  Kemball’s column covered on the outer flank by the cavalry brigade was to make a turning movement to attack the Dujailah redoubt from the south, supported by the remainder of the force, operating from a position to the east of the redoubt.  The night march by this large force, which led across the enemy’s front to a position on his right flank, was a difficult operation, entailing movement over unknown ground, and requiring most careful arrangement to attain success.”

Thanks to excellent staff work and good march discipline the troops reached their allotted position apparently undiscovered by the enemy, but while Keary’s column was in position at daybreak, ready to support Kemball’s attack, the latter’s command did not reach the point selected for its deployment in the Dujailah depression until more than an hour later.  This delay was highly prejudicial to the success of the operation.

When, nearly three hours later, Kemball’s troops advanced to the attack, they were strongly opposed by the enemy from trenches cleverly concealed in the brushwood, and were unable to make further ground for some time, though assisted by Keary’s attack upon the redoubt from the east.  The southern attack was now reinforced, and by 1 P.M. had pushed forward to within five hundred yards of the redoubt, but concealed trenches again stopped further progress and the Turks made several counter-attacks with reinforcements which had by now arrived from the direction of Magasis.

It was about this time that the Corps Commander received from his engineer officers the unwelcome news that the water supply contained in rain-water pools and in Dujailah depression, upon which he had reckoned, was insufficient and could not be increased by digging.  It was clear, therefore, that unless the Dujailah redoubt could be carried that day the scarcity of water would, of itself, compel the troops to fall back.  Preparations were accordingly made for a further assault on the redoubt, and attacks were launched from the south and east under cover of a heavy bombardment.