The German Balkan army captured Belgrade on the 9th of October, and by that date two Bulgarian armies were on the Serbian frontier.  Serbia found herself opposed by two hundred thousand Austro-Germans and a quarter of a million Bulgarians.  Greece and Roumania fully mobilized and were watching the conflict, and the small allied contingent at Saloniki was preparing to march inland to the aid of Serbia.

The conduct of Greece on this occasion has led to universal criticism.  The King himself, no doubt, was mainly moved by his German wife and the influence of his Imperial brother-in-law.  Those that were associated with him were probably moved by fear.  They had been much impressed by the strength of the German armies.  They had seen the success of the great German offensive in Russia, while the French and British were being held in the West.  They knew, too, the strength of Bulgaria.  The national characteristic of the Greeks is prudence, and it cannot be denied that there was great reason to suppose that the armies of Greece would not be able to resist the new attack.  With these views Venizelos, the greatest statesman that Greece had produced for many years, did not agree, and the election seemed to show that he was supported by the majority of the Greek people.

This was another case where the Allies, faced by a dangerous situation, were acting with too great caution.  In Gallipoli they had failed, because at the very beginning they had not used their full strength.  Now, again, knowing as they did all that depended upon it, bound as they were to the most loyal support of Serbia, the aid they sent was too small to be more than a drop in the bucket.  It must be remembered, however, that the greatest leaders among the Allies were at all times opposed to in any way scattering their strength.  They believed that the war was to be won in France.  Military leaders in particular yielded under protest to the political leaders when expeditions of this character were undertaken.

Certainly this is true, that the world believed that Serbia had a right to Allied assistance.  The gallant little nation was fighting for her life, and public honor demanded that she should be aided.  It was this strong feeling that led to the action that was taken, in spite of the military opinions.  It was, however, too late.

In the second week of October Serbia found herself faced by an enemy which was attacking her on three sides.  She herself had been greatly weakened.  Her losses in 1914, when she had driven Austria from her border, must have been at least two hundred thousand men.  She had suffered from pestilence and famine.  Her strength now could not have been more than two hundred thousand, and though she was fairly well supplied with munitions, she was so much outnumbered that she could hardly hope for success.  On her west she was facing the Austro-German armies; on her east Bulgaria; on the south Albania.  Her source of supplies was Saloniki and this was really her only hope.  If the Allies at Saloniki could stop the Bulgarian movement, the Serbians might face again the Austro-Germans.  They expected this help from the Allies.