DANGER OF RATE BEING CUT.—­Piece work becomes objectionable only when the rate is cut.  The moment the rate is cut the first time, the man begins to wonder whether it is going to be cut again, and his attention is distracted from the work by his debating this question constantly.  At best, his attention wanders from one subject to the other, and back again.  It cannot be concentrated on his work.  After the rate has been cut once or twice,—­and it is sure to be cut unless it has been set from scientifically derived elementary time units,—­the man loses his entire confidence in the stability of the rate, and, naturally, when he loses this confidence, his work is done more slowly, due to lack of further enthusiasm.  On the contrary, as long as it is to his advantage to do the work and he is sure that his reward will be prompt, and that he will always get the price that has been determined as right by him and by the employers for his work, he can do this work easily in the time set.  As soon as he feels that he will not get it, he will naturally begin to do less, as it will be not only to his personal advantage to do as little as possible, but also very much to the advantage of his fellows, for whom the rate will also be cut.

TASK WAGE CONTAINS NO INCENTIVE TO ADDITIONAL WORK.—­What Schloss calls the Task Wage would, as he well says, be the intermediate between time or day wage and piece wage; that is, it would be the assigning of a definite amount of work to be done in definite time, and to be paid for by a definite sum.  If the task were set scientifically, and the time scientifically determined, as it must naturally be for a scientific task, and the wage adequate for that work, there would seem to be nothing about this form of remuneration which could be a cause of dissatisfaction to the worker.  Naturally, however, there would be absolutely no chance for him to desire to go any faster than the time set, or to accomplish any more work in the time set than that which he was obliged to, in that he could not possibly get anything for the extra work done.

WORTH OF PREVIOUS METHODS IN THE HANDLING.—­It will be noted in the discussion of the three types of compensation so far discussed, that there is nothing in them that renders them unscientific.  Any one of the three may be used, and doubtless all are used, on works which are attempting to operate under Scientific Management.  Whether they really are scientific methods of compensation or not, is determined by the way that they are handled.  Certainly, however, all that any of these three can expect to do is to convince the man that he is being treated justly; that is to say, if he knows what sort of a contract he is entering into, the contract is perfectly fair, provided that the management keeps its part of the contract, pays the agreed-upon wage.

In proceeding, instead of following the order of Schloss we will follow the order, at least for a time, of Dr. Taylor In “A Piece Rate System”; this for two reasons: