without preparation, into war with the strongest military powers of the world—­so striking is the contrast between the assertions of these men and the letters and reports of Washington, that it may be well for the cool and dispassionate lover of truth to occasionally refresh his memory by reference to the writings of Washington.  The following brief extracts are from his letters to the President of Congress, December, 1776: 

“The saving in the article of clothing, provisions, and a thousand other things, by having nothing to do with the militia, unless in cases of extraordinary exigency, and such as could not be expected in the common course of events, would amply support a large army, which, well officered, would be daily improving, instead of continuing a destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob.  In my opinion, if any dependence is placed on the militia another year, Congress will be deceived.  When danger is a little removed from them they will not turn out at all.  When it comes home to them, the well-affected, instead of flying to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in removing their families and effects; while the disaffected are concerting measures to make their submission, and spread terror and dismay all around, to induce others to follow their example.  Daily experience and abundant proofs warrant this information.  Short enlistments, and a mistaken dependence upon our militia, have been the origin of all our misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt.  The militia come in, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last, at a critical moment.”

These remarks of Washington will not be found too severe if we remember the conduct of our militia in the open field at Princeton, Savannah River, Camden, Guilford Court-House, &c., in the war of the Revolution; the great cost of the war of 1812 as compared with its military results; the refusal of the New England militia to march beyond the lines of their own states, and of the New-York militia to cross the Niagara and secure a victory already won; or the disgraceful flight of the Southern militia from the field of Bladensburg.

But there is another side to this picture.  If our militia have frequently failed to maintain their ground when drawn up in the open field, we can point with pride to their brave and successful defence of Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Fort McHenry, Stonington, Niagara, Plattsburg, in proof of what may be accomplished by militia in connection with fortifications.