“These works fulfilled their object. They protected the great port and depot of Cronstadt and the capital of the empire from invasion.  For two successive years did the mighty armaments of France and England threaten; but they were overawed by the frowning array of ’casemated castles’ which presented itself, and declined the contest.”

“Let us turn our eyes now to the great naval depot of France.  After the almost incredible expenditure lavished here, in creating a harbor facing the shores of her great rival, England, and an equally profuse expenditure in providing all that constitutes a great naval depot, we may suppose that the best means, without regard to cost, which the science of man could devise, would be employed here to make this great seat of naval power secure against the formidable means of attack possessed by the great maritime power most likely to be the assailant.  The means there employed are (so far as regards mere harbor defence) precisely the same (viz., casemated works in several tiers, combined with open batteries where the locations are favorable); and the application of means is the same as we have found so successful in Russia,—­the same which constitute the system of harbor defence of New York.”

Captain McClelland, in his official report to the War Department, on the siege of Sebastopol, uses language equally strong and pertinent:—­

“The permanent defences of Sebastopol against an attack by water, although inferior in material and the details of construction to our own most recent works, proved fully equal to the purpose for which they were intended.  Indeed, the occurrences on the Pacific, the Baltic, and the Black Sea, all seem to establish beyond controversy, the soundness of the view so long entertained by all intelligent military men, that well constructed fortifications must always prove more than a match for the strongest fleet.”

   “It is deemed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and
   imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced
   persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points:” 

   “1st.  That our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and
   proper one, which ought to be completed and armed with the least
   possible delay.”

“2d.  That mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the forces that would be brought against us, were we involved in an European war, but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline, and directed by that consummate and mechanical skill which can only be acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose, and by long habit.”

“In the day of sailing-vessels the successful siege of Sebastopol would have been impossible.  It is evident that the Russians did not appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were unprepared to sustain a siege.”