The results of this “simulachre of a naval cannonade,” as it has been called, is worthy of note.  The details are taken from Major Barnard’s able pamphlet on “The Dangers and Defences of New York,” and Commander Dahlgren’s interesting and valuable work on “Shells and Shell Guns.”

“The allied fleet consisted of 14 French, 10 British, and 2 Turkish ships-of-the-line (some few of which had auxiliary steam power), and a number of side-wheel steamers to tow these; and carried in all about 2,500 guns.  It was opposed by about 280 guns from the works.  The fleet kept itself (in general) at a respectable distance (from 1500 to 2000 yards); too far to inflict any material injury with its armament (32-pounders, with a moderate proportion of 8-inch shell-guns) upon the works;—­too far to receive much from the inefficient armament of the Russian works.”

“The only exception to this remark applies to the detached English squadron under Sir Edmund Lyons, consisting of the Agamemnon, Sanspareil, London, Arethusa, and Albion, the first-named of which vessels took a position at 750 or 800 yards from Fort Constantine, while the others stretched along at about the same distance from Fort Constantine, the ‘Wasp Tower,’ and ‘Telegraph Battery.’  Dahlgren describes the result as follows:—­”

“The Agamemnon was very seriously maltreated, though not to such an extent as to impair her power of battery or engine.  She was on fire several times; was struck by 240 shot or shells; and, singular to say, only lost 29, while her second, just by, lost 70 men.  The Albion suffered still more, and in an hour was towed out crippled, and on fire in more than one place, with a loss of 81 men.  The crews of the London and Arethusa, fared rather better, but the ships nearly as ill; and they too remained in station but a little time after the Albion.  The Queen was driven off soon after she got into her new position, in great danger; and the Rodney had the bare satisfaction of getting aground and afloat after experiencing some damage.”

“The value of the small works on the cape and bluffs, was clearly defined in these results; being above the dense cloud of smoke that enveloped the ships and the lower forts, their aim was not embarrassed, while the seamen labored under the difficulty of firing, with an inconvenient elevation, at objects that they saw but seldom, and then but dimly and briefly.  As a consequence, three line-of-battle ships and a frigate were driven off very shortly and in great peril, and a fourth badly cut up; while the Agamemnon lay opposed to one of the heaviest sea-forts with two tiers of casemates, and at the end of five-hours came off with comparatively little loss.”

“Whatever superiority of effect the batteries on the heights may have had (and we have so few details about these works that we can draw no sure conclusion from this mere naked statement of damages received by the vessels), it evidently was not for want of being hit often enough (smoke or no smoke), that the Agamemnon escaped with so little injury.  She ‘was struck by 240 shot and shells;’ and it is only due to the inefficiency of the projectiles by which she was struck, that she was not destroyed.”