With respect to the double line of operations of Taylor and Scott it may be sufficient to remark, that Santa Anna, from his central position, fought, with the same troops, the battles of Buena Vista and Cerro Gordo.  It should also be remarked, that the line of operations of the army of the Rio Grande was not approved by either Scott or Taylor, nor, it is believed, by any other officer of our army.  Scott’s line of operations, however, was truly strategic, and in turning the Mexican flank by Lake Chalco and the Pedregal, he exhibited the skill of a great general.

The war in the Crimea, from the limited extent of the theatre of operations, afforded but little opportunity for the display of strategic skill on either side.  Nevertheless, the movements of both parties, prior to the investment and siege of Sebastopol, are fair subjects for military criticism with respect to the plans of operation.

When the allies landed their troops at the Old Fort, three plans were open for the consideration of the Russian general:  1st.  To destroy or close the harbors of Balaklava, Kamiesch, Kazatch and Strelitzka, and, garrisoning Sebastopol with a strong force, to occupy with the rest of his army the strong plateau south of the city, and thus force the allies to besiege the strong works on the north. 2d.  Having closed the harbors on the south, and secured Sebastopol from being carried by the assault of any detachment of the allies, to operate on their left flank, annoying and harassing them with his Cossacks, and thus delay them many days in the difficult and precarious position which they would have occupied. 3d.  To advance with his whole force and offer them battle at the Alma.  The last and least advantageous of these plans was adopted, and as the garrison of Sebastopol, during the battle, consisted of only four battalions and the sailors of the fleet, it might, considering the weakness of its works, have been easily carried by a detachment of the allied forces.

For the allies at the Alma two plans presented themselves:  1st.  To turn the Russian left, cut him off from Sebastopol, and occupy that city in force. 2d.  To turn the Russian right, and, throwing him back upon Sebastopol, cut him off from all external succor.  Neither plan was fully carried out.  The column of General Bosquet turned the Russian left and decided his retreat; but no strategic advantage was taken of the victory.  The battle was fought on the 20th of September, and by noon of the 26th the allies had only advanced to the Balbeck, a distance of a little more than ten miles in six days!  On the 27th they regained their communication with the fleet at Balaklava, without attempting to occupy Sebastopol, and having exposed themselves to destruction by an ill-conducted flank march.  Fortunately for the allies, the Russians failed to avail themselves of the advantages which the enemy had thus gratuitously afforded.  The fleet having entered the open harbor of Balaklava, the allies now commenced the labor of landing and moving up their siege material and of opening their trenches, while the Russians prepared their fortifications on the south of Sebastopol for resisting the operations of that gigantic siege which stands without a parallel in history.