This system of defence for our Northern frontier has been much commented on by men professing some knowledge of the military art, and various opinions have been advanced respecting its merits.  Some have thought that more and larger works should be placed on the western extremity of this line; others attach by far the greatest importance to the central or Montreal portion of the frontier; while others, again, attach a higher value to the eastern extremity of the line.

These last would have us concentrate our main forces on the head-waters of the Kennebec and the Penobscot, and then advance upon Quebec, a distance of some 250 miles, along the isolated carriage-road, through the valley of the Chaudiere.  Here is only a single road, but little travelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited wilderness.  General Jomini says emphatically, that a line of operations should always offer two or three roads for the movement of an army in the sphere of its enterprises,—­an insuperable objection to the Kennebec route, except as a diversion to the main attack.  But there are still stronger objections to this route, than its want of feasibility for the transportation of the main army; for even should that army succeed in reaching Quebec in safety, the expedition would be entirely without military results, unless that fortress could be immediately reduced,—­a contingency which would be extremely doubtful under the most favorable circumstances; and even should we be ever so fortunate in our operations, the siege of such a place would occupy a considerable length of time.  It would be throwing our forces along the most difficult line of operations, against the strongest point in the enemy’s line of defence, and making the success of the whole plan depend upon the contingency of a reduction, in a few days, of one of the strongest fortresses in the world.  What principle in military science would justify such a plan of campaign?  We are fully aware of the great advantages to be derived from the reduction of Quebec; and we are also aware of the great difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to accomplish that object.  It may, and probably will ere long, be made to surrender to our arms; but it would be utter folly to base our military operations on the contingency of a short and successful siege.  By advancing upon Montreal by the Lake Champlain route, we could cut off the Canadian forces in the West from all reinforcements; and then, as circumstances might direct, could besiege Quebec, or attack the enemy in the field, or perhaps, manoeuvring as the French did at the siege of Mantua, accomplish both objects at the same time.