the flower of the force now enrolled; and it was further
strengthened by the addition of a body of Gothic auxiliaries.
It was determined, moreover, that the attack should
this time be made on the side of Armenia, where it
was felt that the Romans would have the double advantage
of a friendly country, and of one far more favorable
for the movements of infantry than for those of an
army whose strength lay in its horse. The number
of the troops employed was still small. Galerius
entered Armenia at the head of only 25,000 men; but
they were a picked force, and they might be augmented,
almost to any extent, by the national militia of the
Armenians. He was now, moreover, as cautious as
he had previously been rash; he advanced slowly, feeling
his way; he even personally made reconnaissances,
accompanied by only one or two horsemen, and, under
the shelter of a flag of truce, explored the position
of his adversary. Narses found himself overmatched
alike in art and in force. He allowed himself
to be surprised in his camp by his active enemy, and
suffered a defeat by which he more than lost all the
fruits of his former victory. Most of his army
was destroyed; he himself received a wound, and with
difficulty escaped by a hasty flight. Galerius
pursued, and, though he did not succeed in taking
the monarch himself, made prize of his wives, his
sisters, and a number of his children, besides capturing
his military chest. He also took many of the most
illustrious Persians prisoners. How far he followed
his flying adversary is uncertain; but it is scarcely
probable that he proceeded much southward of the Armenian
frontier. He had to reinstate Tiridates in his
dominions, to recover Eastern Mesopotamia, and to
lay his laurels at the feet of his colleague and master.
It seems probable that having driven Narses from Armenia,
and left Tiridates there to administer the government,
he hastened to rejoin Diocletian before attempting
any further conquests.
The Persian monarch, on his side, having recovered
from his wound, which could have been but slight,
set himself to collect another army, but at the same
time sent an ambassador to to the camp of Galerius,
requesting to know the terms on which Rome would consent
to make peace. A writer of good authority has
left us an account of the interview which followed
between the envoy of the Persian monarch and the victorious
Roman. Apharban (so was the envoy named) opened
the negotiations with the following speech:
“The whole human race knows,” he said,
“that the Roman and Persian kingdoms resemble
two great luminaries, and that, like a man’s
two eyes, they ought mutually to adorn and illustrate
each other, and not in the extremity of their wrath
to seek rather each other’s destruction.
So to act is not to act manfully, but is indicative
rather of levity and weakness; for it is to suppose
that our inferiors can never be of any service to
us, and that therefore we had bettor get rid of them.