and resolutely persisted in his determination to acquire possession of it, until at last he succeeded.  When, in A.D. 337, he challenged Rome to a trial of strength, he might have seemed rash and presumptuous.  But the event justified him.  In a war which lasted twenty-seven years, he fought numerous pitched battles with the Romans, and was never once defeated.  He proved himself greatly superior as a general to Constantius and Jovian, and not unequal to Julian.  By a combination of courage, perseverance, and promptness, he brought the entire contest to a favorable issue, and restored Persia, in A.D. 363, to a higher position than that from which she had descended two generations earlier.  If he had done nothing more than has already come under our notice, he would still have amply deserved that epithet of “Great” which, by the general consent of historians, has been assigned to him.  He was undoubtedly among the greatest of the Sassanian monarchs, and may properly be placed above all his predecessors, and above all but one of those who succeeded him.

CHAPTER XI.

Attitude of Armenia during the War between Sapor and Julian.  Sapor’s Treachery towards Arsaces.  Sapor conquers Armenia.  He attacks Iberia, deposes Sauromaces, and sets up a new King.  Resistance and Capture of Artogerassa.  Difficulties of Sapor.  Division of Iberia between the Roman and Persian Pretenders.  Renewal of Hostilities between Rome and Persia.  Peace made with Valens.  Death of Sapor.  His Coins.

“Rex Persidis, longaevus ille Sapor, post imperatoris Juliani excessum et pudendse pacis icta foedera . . . irqectabat Armeniae manum.”—­Amm.  Marc, xxvii. 18.

The successful issue of Sapor’s war with Julian and Jovian resulted in no small degree from the attitude which was assumed by Armenia soon after Julian commenced his invasion.  We have seen that the emperor, when he set out upon his expedition, regarded Armenia as an ally, and in forming his plans placed considerable dependence on the contingent which he expected from Arsaces, the Armenian monarch.  It was his intention to attack Ctesiphon with two separate armies, acting upon two converging lines.  While he himself advanced with his main force by way of the Euphrates valley and the Nahr-Malcha, he had arranged that his two generals, Procopius and Sebastian, should unite their troops with those of the Armenian king, and, after ravaging a fertile district of Media, make their way towards the great city, through Assyria and Adiabene, along the left bank of the Tigris.  It was a bitter disappointment to him when, on nearing Ctesiphon, he could see no signs and hear no tidings of the northern army, from which he had looked for effectual aid at this crisis of the campaign.  We have now to consider how this failure came about, what circumstances induced that hesitation and delay on the part of Sebastian and Procopius which had at any rate a large share in frustrating Julian’s plans and causing the ill-success of his expedition.