to take a part in his projected campaign.  He spoke of employing Monseses in a separate expedition.  Under these circumstances Phraates became alarmed.  He sent a message to Monseses with promises of pardon and favor, which that chief thought worthy of acceptance.  Hereupon Monseses represented to Antony that by a peaceful return he might perhaps do him as much service as by having recourse to arms; and though Antony was not persuaded, he thought it prudent to profess himself well satisfied, and to allow Monseses to quit him.  His relations with Parthia, he said, might perhaps be placed on a proper footing without a war, and he was quite willing to try negotiation.  His ambassadors should accompany Monasses.  They would be instructed to demand nothing of Phraates but the restoration of the Roman standards taken from Crassus, and the liberation of such of the captive soldiers as were still living.’

But Antony had really determined on war.  It may be doubted whether it had required the overtures of Monseses to put a Parthian expedition into his thoughts.  He must have been either more or less than a man if the successes of his lieutenants had not stirred in his mind some feeling of jealousy, and some desire to throw their victories into the shade by a grand and noble achievement.  Especially the glory of Ventidius, who had been allowed the much-coveted honor of a triumph at Rome on account of his defeats of the Parthians in Cilicia and Syria, must have moved him to emulation, and have caused him to cast about for some means of exalting his own military reputation above that of his subordinates.  For this purpose nothing, he must have known, would be so effectual as a real Parthian success, the inflicting on this hated and dreaded foe of an unmistakable humiliation, the dictating to them terms of peace on their own soil after some crushing and overwhelming disaster.  And, after the victories of Ventidius, this did not appear to be so very difficult.  The prestige of the Parthian name was gone.  Roman soldiers could be trusted to meet them without alarm, and to contend with them without undue excitement or flurry.  The weakness, as well as the strength, of their military system had come to be known; and expedients had been devised by which its strong points were met and counterbalanced.  At the head of sixteen legions, Antony might well think that he could invade Parthia successfully, and not only avoid the fate of Crassus, but gather laurels which might serve him in good stead in his contest with his great political rival.

Nor can the Roman general be taxed with undue precipitation or with attacking in insufficient force.  He had begun, as already noticed, with securing the co-operation of the Armenian king, Artavasdes, who promised him a contingent of 7000 foot and 6000 horse.  His Roman infantry is estimated at 60,000; besides which he had 10,000 Gallic and Iberian horse, and 30,000 light armed and cavalry of the Asiatic allies.