The political consequences of the great triumph which the Parthians had achieved were less than might have been anticipated.  Mesopotamia was, of course, recovered to its extremest limit, the Euphrates; Armenia was lost to the Roman alliance, and thrown for the time into complete dependence upon Parthia.  The whole East was, to some extent, excited; and the Jews, always impatient of a foreign yoke, and recently aggrieved by the unprovoked spoliation of their Temple by Crassus, flew to arms.  But no general movement of the Oriental races took place.  It might have been expected that the Syrians, Phoenicians, Cilicians, Oappadocians, Phrygians, and other Asiatic peoples whose proclivities were altogether Oriental, would have seized the opportunity of rising against their Western lords and driving the Romans back upon Europe.  It might have been thought that Parthia at least would have assumed the offensive in force, and have made a determined effort to rid herself of neighbors who had proved so troublesome.  But though the conjuncture of circumstances was most favorable, the man was wanting.  Had Mithridates or Tigranes been living, or had Surenas been king of Parthia, instead of a mere general, advantage would probably have been taken of the occasion, and Rome might have suffered seriously.  But Orodes seems to have been neither ambitious as a prince nor skilful as a commander; he lacked at any rate the keen and all-embracing glance which could sweep the political horizon and, comprehending the exact character of the situation, see at the same time how to make the most of it.  He allowed the opportunity to slip by without putting forth his strength or making any considerable effort; and the occasion once lost never returned.

In Parthia itself one immediate result of the expedition seems to have been the ruin of Surenas.  His services to his sovereign had exceeded the measure which it is safe in the East for a subject to render to the crown.  The jealousy of his royal master was aroused, and he had to pay the penalty of over-much success with his life.  Parthia was thus left without a general of approved merit, for Sillaces, the second in command during the war with Crassus, had in no way distinguished himself through the campaign.  This condition of things may account for the feebleness of the efforts made in B.C. 52 to retaliate on the Romans the damage done by their invasion.  A few weak bands only passed the Euphrates, and began the work of plunder and ravage, in which they were speedily disturbed by Cassius, who easily drove them back over the river.  The next year, however, a more determined attempt was made.  Orodes sent his son, Pacorus, the young bridegroom, to win his spurs in Syria, at the head of a considerable force, and supported by the experience and authority of an officer of ripe age, named Osaces.  The army crossed the Euphrates unresisted, for Cassius, the governor, had with him only the broken remains of Crassus’s army, consisting