as outweighing the unsupported authority of the romance-writer, Xenophon; and though it would be rash to decide that such things as siege-towers, battering rams, and balistce—­all of which are found to have been in constant use under the Assyrian and Babylonian monarchies—­were wholly discarded by, or unknown to, their successors in the government of Asia, yet a wise criticism will conclude, that they were, at any rate, unfamiliar to the Persians, rarely and sparingly (if at all) employed by them, other methods of accomplishing the ends whereto they served having more approved themselves to this ingenious people.  In ordinary sieges it would seem that they trusted to the bank or mound, while sometimes they drove mines under the walls, and sought in this way to effect a breach.  Where the place attacked was of great strength, they had recourse in general either to stratagem or to blockade.  Occasionally they employed the destructive force of fire, and no doubt they often succeeded by the common method of escalade.  On the whole, it must certainly be said that they were successful in their sieges, exhibiting in their conduct of them courage, activity, and considerable fertility of resource.

A Persian army was usually, though not always, placed under a single commander.  This commander was the monarch, if he was present; if not, it was a Persian, or a Mede, nominated by him.  Under the commander-in-chief were a number of general officers, heads of corps or divisions, of whom we find, in one instance, as many as nine.  Next in rank to these were the chiefs of the various ethnic contingents composing the army, who were, probably, in general the satraps of the different provinces.  Thus far appointments were held directly from the crown; but beyond this the system was changed.  The ethnic or satrapial commanders appointed the officers next below themselves, the captains over a thousand, and (if their contingent was large enough to admit it) the captains over ten thousand; who, again, nominated their subordinates, commanders of a hundred, and commanders of ten.  Thus, in the main, a decimal scale prevailed.  The lowest rank of officers commanded each ten men, the next lowest a hundred, the next to that a thousand, the next ten thousand.  The officer over ten thousand was sometimes a divisional chief; sometimes he was subject to the commander of an ethnic contingent, who was himself under the orders of the head of a division.  Altogether there were six ranks of officers, exclusive of the commander-in-chief.

The proper position of the commander-in-chief was considered to be the centre of the line of battle.  He was regarded as safer there than he would have been on either wing; and it was seen that, from such a position, his orders would be most rapidly conveyed to all parts of the battlefield.  It was not, however, thought to be honorable that he should keep aloof from the fight, or avoid risking his own person.  On the contrary, he was expected to take an active