The conquest of Egypt was immediately followed by the submission of the neighboring tribes.  The Libyans of the desert tract which borders the Nile valley to the west, and even the Greeks of the more remote Barca and Cyrene, sent gifts to the conqueror and consented to become his tributaries.  But Cambyses placed little value on such petty accessions to his power.  Inheriting the grandeur of view which had characterized his father, he was no sooner master of Egypt than he conceived the idea of a magnificent series of conquests in this quarter, whereby he hoped to become Lord of Africa no less than of Asia, or at any rate to leave himself without a rival of any importance on the vast continent which his victorious arms had now opened to him.  Apart from Egypt, Africa possessed but two powers capable, by their political organization and their military strength, of offering him serious resistance.  These were Ethiopia and Carthage—­the one the great power of the South, the equal, if not even the superior, of Egypt—­the other the great power of the West—­remote, little known, but looming larger for, the obscurity in which she was shrouded, and attractive from her reputed wealth.  The views of Cambyses comprised the reduction of both these powers, and also the conquest of the oasis of Ammon.  As a good Zoroastrian, he was naturally anxious to exhibit the superiority of Ormazd to all the “gods of the nations;” and, as the temple of Ammon in the oasis had the greatest repute of all the African shrines, this design would be best accomplished by its pillage and destruction.  It is probable that he further looked to the subjugation of all the tribes on the north coast between the Nile valley and the Carthaginian territory; for he would undoubtedly have sent an army along the shore to act in concert with his fleet, had he decided ultimately on making the expedition.  An unexpected obstacle, however, arose to prevent him.  The Phoenicians, who formed the main strength of his navy, declined to take any part in an attack on Carthage, since the Carthaginians were their colonists, and the relations between the two people had always been friendly.  Cambyses did not like to force their inclinations, on account of their recent voluntary submission; and as, without their aid, his navy was manifestly unequal to the proposed service, he felt obliged to desist from the undertaking.

While the Carthaginian scheme was thus nipped in the bud, the enterprises which Cambyses attempted to carry out led to nothing but disaster.  An army, fifty thousand strong, despatched from Thebes against Ammon, perished to a man amid the sands of the Libyan desert.  A still more numerous force, led by Cambyses himself towards the Ethiopian frontier, found itself short of supplies on its march across Nubia, and was forced to return, without glory, after suffering considerable loss.  It became evident that the abilities of the Persian monarch were not equal to his ambition—­that