Such is the long list of the wars waged by Egypt in Syria.  Are we to suppose that these continuous incursions into Asia have suddenly come to an end?  Are we to imagine that because there has been a respite for a hundred years the precedent of six thousand years has now to be disregarded?  By the recent reconquest of the Sudan it has been shown that the old political necessities still exist for Egypt in the south, impelling her to be mistress of the upper reaches of the Nile.  Is there now no longer any chance of her expanding in other directions should her hands become free?

The reader may answer with the argument that in early days England made invasion after invasion into France, yet ceased after a while to do so.  But this is no parallel.  England was impelled to war with France because the English monarchs believed themselves to be, by inheritance, kings of a large part of France; and when they ceased to believe this they ceased to make war.  The Pharaohs of Egypt never considered themselves to be kings of Syria, and never used any title suggesting an inherited sovereignty.  They merely held Syria as a buffer state, and claimed no more than an overlordship there.  Now Syria is still a buffer state, and the root of the trouble, therefore, still exists.  Though I must disclaim all knowledge of modern politics, I am quite sure that it is no meaningless phrase to say that England will most carefully hold this tendency in check prevent an incursion into Syria; but, with a strong controlling hand relaxed, it would require more than human strength to eradicate an Egyptian tendency—­nay, a habit, of six thousand years’ standing.  Try as she might, Egypt, as far as an historian can see, would not be able to prevent herself passing ultimately into Syria again.  How or when this would take place an Egyptologist cannot see, for he is accustomed to deal in long periods of time, and to consider the centuries as others might the decades.  It might not come for a hundred years or more:  it might come suddenly quite by accident.

In 1907 there was a brief moment when Egypt appeared to be, quite unknowingly, on the verge of an attempted reconquest of her lost province.  There was a misunderstanding with Turkey regarding the delineation of the Syrio-Sinaitic frontier; and, immediately, the Egyptian Government took strong action and insisted that the question should be settled.  Had there been bloodshed the seat of hostilities would have been Syria; and supposing that Egypt had been victorious, she would have pushed the opposing forces over the North Syrian frontier into Asia Minor, and when peace was declared she would have found herself dictating terms from a point of vantage three hundred miles north of Jerusalem.  Can it be supposed that she would then have desired to abandon the reconquered territory?