The creation of an electoral commission to pass upon and decide the disputed points involved was finally suggested, and was accepted by a majority of both parties.  The name of the originator of this suggestion has never been made public; but it is believed by many that Senator Edmunds, of Vermont, was the man, since he was the principal champion of the measure in the Senate.  Subsequent events appeared to indicate that Hon. Wm. M. Evarts of New York, was also an influential party to the scheme, if not the originator of it.  At any rate, no one seemed to have been sufficiently proud of it to lay claim to its paternity.  It was merely a temporary scheme, intended to tide over an unpleasant, and perhaps dangerous, condition which existing remedies did not fully meet.  It was equivalent to disposing of the Presidency by a game of chance,—­for the composition of the proposed commission was, politically, purely a matter of chance.

As finally agreed upon, the measure provided for a commission to be composed of fifteen members,—­five from the House, five from the Senate, and five Justices of the Supreme Court.  As the Democrats had a majority in the House, it was agreed that they should have three, and the Republicans two of the five members of that body.  Since the Republicans had a majority in the Senate it was agreed that they should have three, and the Democrats two of the five members of that body.  Of the five justices of the Supreme Court, two were to be Republicans and two, Democrats; the fifth Justice to be an independent,—­or one who was as near an independent as could be found on the bench of that Court.

When the bill creating this commission came before the House I spoke against it, and voted against it, for two reasons.  In the first place, I believed it was a dangerous precedent to subject the Presidency of the United States to such a game of chance as was contemplated by the bill then under consideration.  Either Hayes or Tilden had been elected, and the result ought to be ascertained according to legal forms.  In the second place, I had a suspicion that it was the outgrowth of an understanding or agreement which would result in the abandonment of Southern Republicans by the National Administration.

Mr. Lamar, for instance, did not hesitate to declare that it was more important that the South should have local self-government than that the President should be a Democrat.  In other words, what Southern Democrats wanted was to be let alone,—­was to have the National Administration keep its hands off, and allow them to manage their own affairs in their own way, even if that way should result in a virtual nullification, in part at least, of the War Amendments to the Federal Constitution.