upon the ’True Order of Studies.’  In the outset of his first essay, (which appeared in March, 1859,) Dr. Hill takes it ’for granted [postulating, we think, a pretty large ground, and one that analysis and proof would better have befitted] that there is a rational order of development in the course of the sciences, and that it ought to be followed in common education.’  The order he finds is that of five great studies, Mathesis, [mathematics;] Physics, or Natural History; History; Psychology; and Theology.  ’We also take it for granted,’ he continues, ’that there is a natural order of development in the human powers, and that studies should be so arranged as to develop the powers in this order.’  Here two very difficult problems are undertaken—­the hierarchy of the sciences, and the analysis of the intellect—­and though we seem to find in the elucidation of the subject traces of that ‘harmony of results of the two lines of inquiry,’ on which the author relies as one source of confirmation of the results themselves, yet we can not admit that the solutions given us remove all, nor even all the main difficulties of the case.  While we regard the mathematics, physics, psychology, and theology as quite well individualized and distinct lines of scientific research, we can not help feeling that the day has hardly come for embracing physiology under either physics or psychology; the forming of the bile and the growing and waste of brain are yet, to our apprehension, too far removed from the gravitation of planets or the oxidation of phosphorus, on the one hand, as they are from the scintillations of wit or the severe march of reason on the other, for ready affiliation with either.  We question decidedly whether Theology proper can, at the most, be more than a very restricted subject; and quite as decidedly whether the heterogeneous matters grouped under History, namely, Agriculture, Trade, Manufactures, the Fine Arts, Language, Education, Politics, and Political Economy, are or can be shown to be linked by any principle of essential unity.  Most of these have their historical side; but their unhistorical and scientific side most interests the great body of learners.  And this latter aspect of some of them, Education and Politics especially, belongs after, not before Psychology.  Then, the great fact of expression—­Language—­has not adequate justice done it by the position it is here placed in.  Want of space is the least among our reasons for forbearing to attempt here a classification of the sciences—­a work which Ramus, D’Alembert, Stewart, Bentham, and Ampere successively essayed and left unfinished.  But the principle that the faculties in their order are called out by the branches named in their order, is quite given up as the writer proceeds, and distinctly so in his Tabular View of the studies adapted to successive ages.  In actual life, usually the first set teaching the infant receives is in language; and even though it previously is and